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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis uses Manuel DeLanda’s realist emergentist ontology to indicate a 
foundation for an ethics of open possibility and experimentation.  DeLanda’s emergentist 
ontology will be used as a bridge that links nature as a creative system to human life as 
self-consciously creative.  As an emergent goal of human life as such, personal 
experimentation has an irreducibly ethical dimension.  I will argue that John Russon’s 
concept of mutual equal recognition or universality-as-sharedness best explicates the 
ethical implications implied by but not explored in the work of DeLanda. 
Chapter 1 is a general introduction and lays out the three competing views to 
which this thesis is opposed and to which it offers an alternative.  Chapter 2 explains the 
meaning and implications of DeLanda’s conception of natural processes as creative, 
suggesting that there are ethical implications for how we ought to live life if reality is as 
DeLanda claims. These ethical implications are emergent properties of natural and social 
organisation.  Thus, Chapter 3 will look at a selection of material from other 
contemporary thinkers on emergence, aiming to bring DeLanda’s conception into further 
relief and explain its unique appropriateness for the ethical implications this thesis is 
explicating.  In Chapter 4, the ethical implications of DeLanda’s ontology will be made 
fully explicit. I will demonstrate how Russon’s principle of mutual equal recognition is 
an emergent property of human history and, as such, the social foundation for the ethics 
of personal experimentation and open possibility implied by but not explicated in 
DeLanda’s ontology.    
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Introduction  
 
The main ontological claim that this thesis defends is that science shows us 
that material nature is creative, that its creative processes have identifiable recurrent 
patterns, but also that these patterns do not limit creativity, but are that by which 
creativity happens.  Myriad forms of organic life employ the same metabolic 
circuits; the great variety of meteorological phenomena that all emerge by 
convection, and the diversity of topological structures of the earth by the slow 
convective movements of its mantel.  To think difference on the basis of these 
patterns is not to reduce complexity to simplicity, it is to see the open ended 
possibilities for creation and experimentation that basic natural processes and 
patterns make possible.  Without these patterns there would be nothing.  These 
patterns are not transcendent ideals.  They are not gods or essences to be worshiped. 
They are immanent to the stuff that is and the foundation for the emergent 
properties that most interest me in this thesis.   
However, my main concern is not ontological, but ethical.  I want to show 
how the creativity of nature is the basis for personal creativity.  The reason why 
invariant patterns ought not be treated as gods or essences is because worship is an 
attitude that closes off possibilities, whereas I want to defend possibility and 
experimentation as the highest ethical goal of human life.  Hence, it is not a matter 
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of worshipping or idealising fixed realities, it is a matter of nurturing the conditions 
of novelty and experimentation.  It is a matter of nurturing the patterns so as to 
maximise the combinations of material out of which structures and creations that 
have value emerge.  It is not a matter of taking the patterns from physics, chemistry, 
biology, and technology and applying them directly to the social realm, it is a 
matter of seeing how the creativity of nature that these sciences disclose can free 
our notions of society from fixed and static hierarchies that limit the creativity of 
human life.  A conception of nature as creative grounds a conception of society as 
an incubator of creativity and an ethics of personal experimentation.  Personal 
creativity and freedom is not a fiction of the human imagination, it is made possible 
by nature itself as an open ended system of material creativity.   
However we must bear in mind that, as you move from relatively simple 
matter-energy-information, to chemical, to organic, to biological, to social systems, 
to creative thought the patterns are differentiated by qualitative differences.  The 
function of emergent properties is to explain the possibility of these qualitative 
differences.  The human social realm is qualitatively different from the others (and 
they from it), because human beings are self-conscious; the patterns of social life 
are in equal part the products of intentional activity, whereas nature is not an 
intentional system.  The most important emergent phenomena of social life are 
meaning, value, and normativity.  We cannot treat these or any other social 
emergences as a physicalist would.  Although they develop out of physical material 
processes, their real nature cannot be reduced to matter.  They must be 
comprehended by objective observation so that any important regularities and 
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patterns immanent to them become clear; to see how they emerge from the more 
basic patterns of natural life.  But the goal is not reduction to material elements and 
dynamics, but opening towards unexplored possibilities made possible by the 
dynamics of natural and social life.  To see the space of possibility we must 
understand the objective frames within which it opens up.   Objective understanding 
of the parts allows us to see how they combine to create open systems like human 
societies, within which we can play with possibility, experiment, and improve our 
lives.  
There is unique inherent value in all levels of reality, expressed as the 
properties, capacities and tendencies that define each.  The human social realm has 
a particular inherent value because it is a set of material and symbolic relations that 
enables each person to become a unique individual human capable of contributing 
in novel and creative ways to the social wholes of which she is a part.  This 
uniquely human value emerges directly from physical elements and interactions, 
but as nature teaches us insofar as it is emergent it is not reducible to the properties, 
capacities and tendencies of the physical materials that compose it insofar as it has 
those of its own.  Social life makes possible, through its symbolic systems and 
institutions, a realm of human thought and meaning which, while it must contend 
with physical reality as a limiting frame, is capable of creatively altering its 
environment and itself (to alter one is to alter both).  This self-conscious creativity 
of action makes it immediately apparent that we are dealing with a qualitatively 
different set of phenomena and capacities than in the non-human realms of natural 
elements and forces.  It is not only more complex insofar as it is made up a material 
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that is more highly organised, but also more valuable than raw nature, in so far as it 
is uniquely capable of overcoming particular limitations on its creative activity by 
understanding and transforming them.    
The human social world emerges from the interaction of humans and that it 
is “[e]mergent ... express[es] a degree of freedom from ... the causal forces that 
govern the parts.  This claim means that more highly organised systems have 
greater latitude for different responses to different stimuli.”1  The creativity of the 
complexity entailed in the interaction of the different elements of the periodic table 
is impressive enough, but consider the interaction of different words, thoughts, 
ideas, beliefs, feelings and commitments and the creativity there entailed.  This 
creativity creates and is created by the social realm, which creates value insofar as it 
creates us as beings who value things.  We care because we are social and we are 
social because we care.  If we care let’s take care, we do care, let’s take care.  
Human beings and the social realm that sustains us are not separated by an absolute 
ontological gulf from the more basic material process from which we have evolved.  
The point is that social creativity develops out of natural creativity, but is more 
valuable because it is self-consciously directed.   The ethics of experimentation that 
I will defend thus finds its depth grounded in nature as spontaneous creativity, but 
requires a definite sort of social relationship—mutual equal recognition—to fully 
develop.  
 
                                                 
1 Jeff Noonan, Materialist Ethics and Life-Value (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2012), 27. 
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Contra Previous Realism and Materialism 
 
While a definite form of social relationship is required by my ethics of 
experimentation, it also requires a definite understanding of the natural world, from 
which the social world develops.  I have chosen to begin with Manuel DeLanda’s 
ontology because it provides a credible conception of nature as spontaneous 
creativity that avoids the problems of reductionism that hamper older forms of 
materialism.  His work covers a wide range of subjects, but it is unified by its realist 
ontology.  It is a realism because unlike some previous realism, it does not end up 
with transcendent essences, seamless wholes or reified necessary (inevitable) 
general categories to ‘explain’ and describe reality and its constituents.2   
DeLanda’s realism is interesting and attractive to my ethical project because it tries 
to rethink how we think and what we think about, by drawing from interesting and 
important ways of observing, analysing, simulating, and experimenting with reality.  
These ways of understanding reality are drawn from mathematics, science, social 
science, the arts, and the humanities.  DeLanda follows Deleuze in believing that 
what these studies of reality show is that “...there are no... universals... nothing 
transcendent, no Unity, subject (or object), Reason; there are only processes, 
sometimes unifying, subjectifying, rationalising, but just processes all the same.”3 
This conception of reality as creative process is important because world views or 
                                                 
2 Classic examples of these three would be Plato, Hegel, and Marx respectively.  
3 Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations: 1972-1990. 1990. Translation by Martin Joughin. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1995), 145. 
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ways of thinking that have made use of older sorts of transcendent types of 
universals have supported, founded, or been indifferent to many disastrous life- 
styles and social and political assemblages.  By freeing our conception of nature 
from static categories, and grounding our understanding of society in DeLanda’s 
conception of nature as creative, we at the same time see our way past old forms of 
oppressive and hierarchical practices towards a new ethics of mutual recognitions 
of each other’s experiments in living. 
DeLanda’s alternative conceives reality as populated by historically assembled 
(emergent) wholes that are identified and explained by real historical processes.  For 
example, if we want to understand cities, we do not start with an abstract theory about the 
‘City’ in general.  Instead, we look at actual cities, perhaps finding patterns or 
mechanisms that can be applied more generally to an actual population of studied cities.  
Wholes, like cities, humans, and languages, are assemblages which emerge from 
processes and are always in process.  In other words, everything is to some degree 
emergent, that is, has properties, capacities and tendencies that are not shared by the parts 
whose interactions a whole emerges from and is sustained by.  Assemblages (whole-
parts) have no essences by reference to which their existence is explained and “[u]nlike 
organic totalities, the parts of an assemblage do not form a seamless whole,” they are not 
static and closed, they are open and fluid.
4
   DeLanda draws the foundations and 
inspiration for this ontology from Deleuze, but DeLanda’s articulation “[uses] ... different 
theoretical resources and lines of argument.”5 This indicates the robustness of the 
                                                 
4 DeLanda, New Philosophy of Society, 4 
5 DeLanda, ISVP, 3. 
7 
 
7 
 
ontology.
6
  What is presented is a world of processes where nothing is closed, finished or 
total, and nothing is explainable with reference to eternal essences or archetypes.  So, 
how do we explain the identifiable wholes there are?   
DeLanda addresses this issue as follows:     
Given that essences are typically postulated to explain the existence of individuals or of natural 
kinds, eliminating them involves giving an alternative explanation, not reducing these individuals 
and kinds to social conventions.7 
    
From the above quotation it is clear that DeLanda, while rejecting reductionist 
explanations of material processes, also wants to avoid the opposite extreme of a 
relativistic social constructivism.  By ‘social conventions’ he means reducing everything 
to contingent language-games which run the risk of eliminating material reality as any 
sort of constraint or frame on human action.  He is also arguing against the use of 
generalised or reified categories, specifically in the case of the social sciences where their 
use obscures the real social agents and groupings that could be the object of study.  It is 
not that these general categories are not useful, they have helped grow our understanding 
of reality, it is that now thanks to this grown (and still growing) understanding we can 
continue to replace generality with concrete creative complexity (from which contingent 
generalities may emerge).   
On my reading, DeLanda’s ontology founds and is founded by a conception of 
reality as creative complexity driven by difference.  I make the link from his ‘general 
ontology’ to the social realm through this conception of reality.  Because the social realm 
                                                 
6 Multi-realisability is an important feature of what emerges from nonlinear systems; of solutions 
to nonlinear problems.  The ontology itself exhibits this important feature of the reality it argues for.   
7 Manuel DeLanda, Intensive Science and Virtual philosophy (New York, NY: Continuum, 
2002), 88. Hereafter ISVP. 
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(and the thought realm that emerges from it) has real effect (manifestation) in the 
physical realm—we change our natural environment through social activity—and it is 
equally a reality with unique properties, capacities, and tendencies manifested as creative 
complexity driven by difference, it is equally a material reality with all that entails and 
does not entail.   
While Deleuze is the genetic father of this ontology insofar as he brought its 
important parts into interaction, DeLanda’s version will, for the most part, be treated as 
the singular individual it is
 
.
8
  Given the breadth and depth of DeLanda’s work, and its 
growing influence across many fields, this focus is warranted.  What I intend to draw out 
of my reading of DeLanda’s ontology is that it can found an ethics of open 
experimentation, by showing that creativity is a fundamental property of reality and 
needs to be nurtured as such.  This interpretation rests on the assumption that there is a 
link between ontology, the social, and ethics.  Broadly speaking, the links amount to the 
reality that the choices we make, the ways we chose to live and the choices that are 
available to us, entail views of reality which can be understood in more or less detailed 
and concrete ways.  So, understanding views of reality (ontology) is part of 
understanding decision making and the decisions that are available to be made.  Ontology 
and ethics entail each other through humans being social beings who bring meaning to 
reality, where reality is one that includes meaning and ideas as no more and no less real 
parts of reality.  An ontology that is capable of grasping the layered complexity of 
                                                 
8 Singular (singularity) for Deleuze/DeLanda refers to uniqueness, not that there is necessarily 
only one; in Deleuze’s world everything is in populations.  In this case, DeLanda’s ontology is a unique 
member of a population of theories that have emerged from the interaction of certain ways of thinking 
about the world.  Ways that will be discussed in the next chapter.   
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natural, social, and individual reality is important because it provides grounds for ethics 
in real material processes.  The possibility of an ethics of individual experimental 
learning and living is rooted in society as a collective effort of experimental learning and 
living, which in turn has emerged from nature as a set of unconscious material 
experiments in organisation.   
 
Emergent Ethics Contra Progressive Teleology 
 
Thus, the main goal of this thesis is to uncover the way in which DeLanda’s 
ontology has ethical significance, even though he himself may not explicitly articulate 
what that significance is.  The thesis thus addresses the question raised by Levi Bryant, 
Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman in “Towards a Speculative Philosophy.”9  “A ... 
serious issue … for realisms and materialisms is the question of whether they can provide 
any grounds or guidelines for ethical and political action. Can they justify normative 
ideals?”10 I will argue that DeLanda’s can because it provides a way of thinking that is 
open to immanent normative ideals that need not be justified by reference to transcendent 
ideals but ideals or goals that emerge from the socio-historical dimension of human life-
activity.   Essentially, DeLanda can provide a materialist/realist ontological grounding for 
what Noonan would call life-grounded ethics or an ethics grounded in life-value.  
                                                 
9 Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman, eds. “Towards a Speculative Philosophy.” The 
Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism (Melbourne, Australia: re-press, 2011). 
10 Bryant, Srnicek and Harman, Speculative Turn, 16. 
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DeLanda’s ontology is suited for this because it is not a downwardly reductive 
physicalism, nor an upwardly reductive essentialism.   
Plato is a classic example of essentialism, but there is also what DeLanda calls 
taxonomic essentialism, which is when general categories of classification are reified. He 
traces this form of essentialism to Aristotle, for whom, at the scale of species, categories 
of classification are necessary and eternal.   For an example of downward reduction see 
Daniel Dennett, Freedom Evolves, where, based on experiments that have reported 
finding a lag of a few microseconds between unconscious neural activity and ‘conscious’ 
decision, he argues that what we think of as conscious human decision making is 
reducible to previous neural activity in the brain.
 11
  However, as Deacon argued, raw 
sense data is colored by previous knowledge and interpretations “that have an irreducible 
social and symbolic content.”12 So, even if consciousness as decisions are initially ‘made’ 
unconsciously by the brain “consciousness itself cannot be removed from the complete 
account of the complex of processes that results in decisions and actions because the 
content to which the brain responds is not raw … but already symbolically processed and 
mediated.”13 Essentially Dennett does not account for the decisions and actions previous 
to the neural activity that is previous to the current decision.   
Another downward reductionist is E. O. Wilson who asserts that “all tangible 
phenomena, from the birth of stars to the workings of social institutions, are based on 
                                                 
11 Daniel Dennett, Freedom Evolves (New York: Viking, 2003) 227-242. 
12 Noonan, Materialist Ethics and Life-Value, 37.  Terence Deacon, The Symbolic Species (New 
York, NY: W. W. Norton, 1997) 
13 Noonan, Materialist Ethics and Life-Value, 37. 
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material processes that are ultimately reducible, however long and tortuous the sequence, 
to the laws of physics.”14 However, as Noonan argues  
holding to the two basic materialist commitments—the primacy of the natural universe, and a 
rejection of ideal substances as causal determinants in natures development—does not entail 
reductionism because reductionism cannot provide consistent and complete reductions of 
meaningful human practices and values [like beauty and goodness] to the interactions of 
meaningless fields of energy.15   
 
While maintaining a commitment to the foundational physicality of material 
reality DeLanda gives equal material reality to the human social realm and what emerges 
from it.  Everything at all scales maintains a degree of irreducibility, of independence 
from its parts and from the wholes of which it is a part, but equally everything at all 
scales maintains a degree of reducibility, of dependence on its parts and on the wholes of 
which it is a part.   
DeLanda himself, however, does not unpack the ethical implications of his 
realism.  In order to explicate what remains implicit in DeLanda, I will draw upon John 
Russon’s concepts from Human Experience.16  The connection that I find between 
DeLanda and Russon is that both understand goals as emergent from processes that are 
not themselves goal directed.  Russon complements DeLanda’s ontology insofar as he 
concentrates explicitly on the social processes from which explicitly ethical goals 
emerge.  On my reading, then, Russon can be seen as providing the ethical conclusions 
                                                 
14 E. O. Wilson, Consiliance: The Unity of Knowledge (New York, NY: Random House, 1998), 
291. 
15 Noonan, Materialist Ethics and Life-Value, 21. 
16 John Russon, Human Experience: Philosophy, Neurosis, and the Elements of Everyday Life 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2003).  Russon’s empirical observation of human 
experience is framed by continental European philosophy of the last 200 years, and Plato, see the 
introduction to Human Experience. 
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implied by but not developed by DeLanda’s understanding of nature as spontaneously 
creative.   I argue that because Russon offers a historical (dynamic-temporal) process to 
explain the emergence (development and maintenance) of human identity and larger 
social wholes, his conception of the good of human life completes DeLanda’s ontology 
by supplying it with concepts to grasp the ethical level of human social reality.    
This ethics is centered on an emergent telos and goal for human life, one that is 
compatible with an ever-changing fluid reality, and an ever-changing fluid human agency 
that is part of that reality.  I use the term telos, even with its historical baggage—that of 
being an imposed reified ideal end—because I want to distinguish conscious human goals 
from those that, whether conscious or not, can be identified through observation, analysis, 
and simulation of human populations.  To a degree this is what social science, theory, and 
philosophy tries to do, I merely encourage us to consider new insights, methods, and 
tools and use them to be less general, reifying, and dogmatic in our observation, analysis, 
and simulation of human populations.  The fundamental goal of human life—
experimentation within a context of mutual recognition—emerges from the process of 
human development qua human development, and not from any source outside of human 
history altogether.   
At the same time, DeLanda’s ontology helps us to see that the fact that this telos 
is emergent from human history does not mean that it is somehow not materially real.   
This telos is not only immanent to human development but immanent to the Universe as 
creative process.  We are a development within and of the universe.  However, as much 
as I want to extend this telos to the universe, I also want to extend reality beyond the 
Universe, and that telos to reality.  The Universe is just the largest whole we are aware 
13 
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we are part of.  The Universe is not exhaustive of reality; reality is not ‘univocal’, that is, 
in the sense of it not being a closed totality:  
Not an analogy of organs or homology of structures but a univocity of material with variable 
connections and positions (assemblages).  Not organic function or structural function but machinic 
functioning ... Univocity is also the thought of the multiple n assemblages into which the material 
enters.”17   
 
Reality is multiplicity, it includes the space created by human minds and groups of 
minds, it is the assemblage of all the possibility spaces of all the possible 
combinations/interactions of the matter-energy-information-thought that might be 
regardless of how much of it we are able to recognise and so be recognised by.  The 
Universe is only all that is for us at a given time.  ‘Reality’ includes not only that which 
is, but also that which is not noticed and that which might be created.  Reality is thus 
effectively infinite in its potential for creativity and variation, and we are part of and 
agents of this creative variation.  When the human social realm and what emerges there is 
given equal material reality, not by reducing it but by including it, the sheer infinite 
multiplicity and creativity of reality, from leptons to ideas, is appreciated.  One is not 
reduced to the other, each is equally real as what each really is. 
From my perspective, unlike physicalism, which is wholly and fundamentally 
non-teleological with its meaningless physical world, DeLanda’s project is only non-
teleological with reference to a specific type of teleology.  It is opposed to the teleology 
of necessary progress toward imposed necessary ideal ends—ends taken to be 
transcendent, pre-existing, essential, and/or eternal.  Such teleology and the ontologies 
entailed are incompatible with a reality of ubiquitous creativity driven by ubiquitous 
                                                 
17 Deleuze, “The Interpretation of Utterances.” Two Regimes of Madness: Text and Interviews 
1975-1995. 2006. Translation by Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina (New York: Semiotexte, 2006) 93. 
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difference.   If a telos is to be compatible with DeLanda’s account of reality, it must 
emerge from reality through real historical processes and not impose stasis on fluidity.  
Teloi, like everything else, are emergent from a process that has a temporal dimension.  
So, in other words, they are historical and contingent rather than metaphysically 
necessary.  ‘Not metaphysically necessary’ in this context means that a different goal 
could have emerged, or not at all.  It is the teleology of necessary progress toward 
necessary (ahistorical) ends that is the problem, not ends, goals or teloi in themselves.   
As I explain more fully the contingent teloi of our lives the links between 
DeLanda’s and Russon’s approaches to emergence will become clear.  I will demonstrate 
that what Russon calls “the natural goal of our intersubjective life” and what I call an 
emergent goal and telos, that is, the “human project of mutual, equal recognition”18 is a 
coherent normative completion of DeLanda’s ontology.  Russon is compatible as a 
completion of DeLanda insofar as DeLanda can be used to support the emergent goal 
drawn from Russon.  I label the resulting philosophy neo-materialism.  This is a label 
DeLanda uses for his own philosophy on occasion.  The neo is used to distinguish it from 
previous materialisms that employed transcendent archetypes, like reified social classes 
and historical stages that follow ‘necessary’ progressions by ‘necessary’ means, as in 
calcified forms of ‘orthodox’ Marxism.   
 
Learning Contra Arresting Development 
 
                                                 
18 Russon, Human Experience, 72.   
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Neo-materialism “eliminates … [the] immutable world of transcendent 
archetypes.”19  However well intentioned the aims behind the positing of those 
archetypes, or general categories, may be or have been they distort both the nature of 
historical development and human goals.  Getting rid of transcendent essences is essential 
to the construction of an ethics of experimentation because, “[w]hen you invoke 
something transcendent you arrest movement ... instead of experimenting.”20 
Transcendent ideas of this kind arrest development, learning, and growth.  Once we have 
eliminated the transcendent ideas, thought can focus upon actual populations of humans 
behaving in particular ways, what they actually do, and what open spaces for novel forms 
of activity there are.  We proceed from a dynamic reality to possibility rather than a 
stereotyped categorisation of reality to fixed hierarchies and settled ways of doing things.   
 However, I do not defend simple accumulation of experience through 
experimentation.  Rather, I defend genuine engagement with what one can and does 
engage with.  The good of life involves learning, growth, development, and self-
transcendence, not simply random accumulation of experiences.
21
  By engaging 
everything engaged in a reflective and critical way we can learn more and better deal 
with what we engage with, whether that engagement be intentional or unintentional.  By 
having a sense of the resources available to us and the ways that matter-energy-
information-thought can be affected, we can respond to the situations in which we find 
ourselves in ways that are novel, creative, and also instructive for others.  The 
                                                 
19 DeLanda, ISVP, 88. 
20 Deleuze, Negotiations, 146. 
21 Self-transcendence is a term from Russon that will be fully articulated later, but essentially it 
captures difference driven development, and so emergence. 
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opportunities for such learning and creation are always instances where our bodies and 
minds are connecting with different material process: 
New [knowledge and new] skills, in short, increase one's capacities to affect and be affected, or to 
put it differently, increase one's capacities to enter into novel assemblages, the assemblage that the 
human body forms with a bicycle, a piece of solid ground and a gravitational field, for example. 
Of course, the exercise of a new skill can soon become routine unless one continues to push the 
learning process in new directions. In addition, while rigid habits may be enough to associate 
linear causes and their constant effects, they are not enough to deal with nonlinear causes that 
demand more adaptive, flexible skills.22 
  
Everything, including one’s self, can be designed for redesign, or better, designed for 
continuous redesign.  Recycling becomes a ubiquitous process of continual upgrading:  
cradle to cradle to cradle, as opposed to the currently prevalent cradle to dump.
 23
 
The understanding of reality as open dynamic process lays the ground work for a 
socio-cultural space-time in which we do what we do because we can and want to, for its 
own sake, for exploration; where we are no longer alienated from each other and the rest 
of what surrounds—though there will always be a degree of alienation insofar as there 
will always be some things at some scale beyond our experience, as well as some 
assholes with whom conflict is inevitable.  Dissolving all alienation is another way of 
framing the ever distant horizon toward which we can consciously develop—a space-
time that can support most humans living a rich life of critical self-transformation.  We 
have an infinite distance to go.  Each life is an experiment to learn from. 
 In order to understand these ethical conclusions, however, we need to first 
examine in detail the ontological foundations that support them.  The next chapter will 
add detail to DeLanda’s world view and so provide an ontological basis for the 
                                                 
22 DeLanda, New Philosophy of Society, 50-51. 
23 Recycling here refers to the products of our labours, but conceptually this statement also applies 
to human development (emergence) as learning/self-transcendence. 
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conception of social order that living a life of genuine experimentation and learning 
requires. 
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CHAPTER II  
WORLD VIEW 
                                                    
Introduction 
 
 This chapter is going to take a conceptual journey through DeLanda’s ontology.  
A large part will discuss what I take to be key concepts for understanding reality as 
creative complexity driven by difference.   The chapter will also discuss some of the 
ways of thinking and ways of living founded on those ways of thinking that DeLanda and 
Deleuze’s ideas and concepts are alternatives to.  These alternative ways of thinking are 
part of preparing us to think about an immanent pattern of human development that does 
not limit but encourages the sustainable development of open ended diversity of life-
activities.  The chapter will be organised as a series of commentaries on the key terms of 
DeLanda’s ontology.  
 
Scale 
 
The ground affords the animal a solid surface only because relative to the speed or temporal scale... of the 
animal, the ground changes too slowly.  At geological time scales this piece of solid ground would indeed 
be much more fluid.24   
 
This quotation introduces us to the importance of the concept of scale in 
DeLanda’s world view.  Central to the concept of scale is how the relationship between 
parts and wholes is understood.  One established position on part-whole relations is 
                                                 
24 DeLanda, ISVP, 97 n. 51 
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micro-reductionism.  Examples of this are micro-economics, which reduces social wholes 
(e.g. a nation-state, friend group or social justice movement) to “mere aggregates of many 
rational decision makers”, and micro-sociology, which reduces social wholes to 
aggregates of “many phenomenological experiences”.25  For DeLanda, this reductionism 
eliminates complexity and so is inadequate to the nature of reality.  In its place he puts 
the idea of emergent properties.
26
  
For DeLanda, micro-reductionism is blocked by the concept of emergent 
properties.  Emergent properties are properties of a whole that are not present in its 
atomised parts.  These properties are actualised as capacities that the parts on their own 
would lack, as a human neural network has the capacity for conscious thought that no 
neuron on its own has.  These properties, like the wholes they uniquely identify, emerge 
from and are sustained by the interaction of parts at scales below the whole.   
Another established position regarding part-whole relations is macro-
reductionism.  For macro-reductionists the whole totally determines its parts, or in other 
terms (pace some Marxists), the superstructure completely determines the substructure.   
For DeLanda:   
Blocking macro-reductionism demands ... the concept of relations of exteriority between 
parts. Unlike wholes in which "being part of this whole" is a defining characteristic of the 
parts, that is, wholes in which the parts cannot subsist independently of the relations they 
have with each other (relations of interiority) we need to conceive of emergent wholes in 
which the parts retain a relative autonomy, so that they can be detached from one whole and 
plugged into another one entering into new interactions.  
                                                 
25 Manuel DeLanda, Deleuze History and Science, (New York, NY: ATROPOS Press, 2010) 3. 
Hereafter DHS. 
26 Emergence, as one of the most important concepts of this thesis, will be explained throughout, 
specifically in Chapter III “EMERGENCE”. For interest see: Star Trek: The Next Generation, 
“Emergence”, Season 7, Episode 23, May 9, 1994.   
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With [emergent properties and relations of exteriority] we can define social wholes, 
like interpersonal networks or institutional organisations, that cannot be reduced to the 
persons that compose them, and that ... do not reduce those persons to the whole, fusing them 
into a totality in which their individuality is lost.
27
 
  
The rejection of micro and macro reductionism leads to DeLanda’s ontology 
being flat.   
By ‘flat’ I mean that the entities that populate reality are not hierarchised 
ontologically.  Whether an entity is part or whole is relative to the scale being observed.  
In any case, neither is any less singular or unique, neither is subordinate to the other.  To 
illustrate, consider a community (e.g. an ethnic community in a city) where we see that 
the emergent property of density (the degree of connection between its members) and the 
emergent “capacity to store reputations and enforce norms, are non-reducible ... [aspects] 
of the community as a whole, but [also] that neither involves thinking of it as a seamless 
totality in which the members’ personal identity is [solely] created by the community”.28  
People can and do relate to other communities and the people in them, and by choice or 
otherwise can and do join other communities, while communities themselves also have 
properties that interact with members’ identities and the members as independent agents 
make decisions and take actions that affect the identity of the community.   
Another articulation of this idea is that wholes exist alongside their parts, that is, 
that once a whole emerges it reacts back on its parts as a separate and equally individual 
singularity.  In A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History DeLanda calls the strong mutual 
                                                 
27 DeLanda, DHS, 3-4. 
28 DeLanda, DHS, 4. 
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interaction between individuals (part-wholes) feedback.
 29
  It is important to note that in 
DeLanda’s “extended sense the term ‘individual’ has no preferential affinity for a 
particular scale (persons or organisms) and refers to any entity that is singular and 
unique”.30  As he says, there is no “ontological distinction between levels of existence 
(such as genus, species, organism) here all entities must be thought of as existing at the 
same ontological level differing only in scale”.31 That entities differ only in scale means 
that the properties of a “whole are not transcendent (existing on a supplementary 
dimension above its parts) but immanent” to its parts and their interactions.  It also means 
that wholes, such as “communities ... are as historically individuated as the persons that 
compose them.”32  All individuals at all scales are equally contingent, they are all only 
necessary and identifiable with reference to their history (their process of their 
emergence) and they as they are as emergent from said process.     
 
Contingency and Necessity 
 
DeLanda’s concept of scale demonstrates how all realities are singularities that 
interact with other singularities in definite processes.  The emergent properties and 
patterns that these interactions generate are unpredictable.  Hence considerations of scale 
lead us to considerations of the meaning of contingency and necessity in DeLanda’s 
                                                 
29 Manuel DeLanda, A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History (New York, NY: Zone Books, 
MIT Press, 1997). Hereafter 1000yrs. 
30 DeLanda, DHS, 5 
31 DeLanda, DHS, 5 
32 DeLanda, DHS, 5 
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ontology.  We will explore this idea through an example drawn from individual life-
history. 
How our lives go can be seen to be contingent with reference to the ‘free’ choices 
we make within the range offered by the reified ideals of reality conceived as static.  For 
instance, some believe it necessary that I be educated, get a job, pay my taxes and raise a 
family.  However, the specifics of that education, what job I get and consequently how 
much tax I pay as well as the size of and how I raise my family (all within a relatively 
narrow range of tolerance) are matters of contingency, that is, dependent on the ‘free’ 
choices ‘I’ make within static reality. 33  The reified ideal is pursued as necessary and the 
real is what happens by chance or choice in pursuit of the ideal.  What happens, the real, 
is subordinate to the ideal.  In actuality, I argue following DeLanda, the ideals or goals 
that we have are immanent to and emerge from the life we actually live and as such are 
contingent.  There is very little, if anything, that is necessary anymore than insofar as it 
has happened.  Necessity is what is real as the result of what has happened, not as having 
been programmed by an ideal.  Nor is necessity to be conflated with probability founded 
on experience, no matter how likely. 
Like the path that water cuts on its way to the ocean, the path of human 
development is contingent and only necessary after the fact, and then not permanently so.  
In the case of water, given the specific mixture of rock and soil over which it must flow, 
the intensity and volume of its flow, meteorological influences, and geological events, the 
path that it takes is the only path it could have taken; the path it did take given reality.  
All that is necessary is what has happened, and only insofar as it has happened. 
                                                 
33 Tolerance is not genuine engagement or recognition. Tolerance here is merely ‘putting up with’. 
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Human beings across recorded history have always found, and continue to find 
regularities that become part of our collection of predictables.  These regularities or 
stabilities, however, are only such relative to the range of spatio-temporal scales we 
manage to experience.  In other words, at some scale they are contingent.   
How we view necessity and contingency thus depends upon the scale at which we 
examine things.  One can begin at the ‘top’ with a whole, break it into its parts, and try to 
make those parts add up to the whole, or one can begin at a ‘lower’ level with the 
interaction of parts and look at how a whole emerges from those interactions.   What 
looks contingent when we look at things from below can appear necessary when we look 
at things from above.  Hence the next crucial concept is bottom-up and top-down 
methodologies. 
 
 
Bottom-up and Top-down 
 
 
Bottom-up synthesis allows us to see how things emerge; it allows us to see the 
feedback between things that catalyses development (emergence).  The components 
distinguished and enumerated by top-down analysis can be used to run synthetic bottom-
up simulations, which are the only way we can adequately try to understand reality and 
its complexity.  The goal is not just to describe regularities, but to explain their 
emergence and so have a more detailed understanding.  Think of the degree of detail, 
complexity, in current Solar System models that provide us predictions through running 
as computer simulations.  Compare that to earlier models/simulations of the Solar System 
as concentric circles or wandering gods.  As DeLanda says: 
24 
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…emergent (or "synergistic") properties belong to the interactions between parts, so it follows that a top-
down analytical approach that begins with the whole and dissects it into its constituent parts (an ecosystem 
into species, a society into institutions), is bound to miss precisely those properties. In other words, 
analysing a whole into parts and then attempting to model it by adding up the components will fail to 
capture any property that emerged from complex interactions, since the effect of the latter may be 
multiplicative (e.g., mutual enhancement) and not just additive. Of course, analytical tools cannot simply be 
dismissed due to this inherent limitation. Rather, a top-down approach to the study of complex entities 
needs to be complemented with a bottom-up approach: analysis needs to go hand in hand with synthesis.
34
 
   
A bottom-up approach begins with the constituent (smaller spatio-temporal scale) 
components of the object of study and proceeds up to the object.  In ecology we now look 
at complex interacting populations, rather than relatively simple food chains or 
hierarchies.  If a city is to be studied one would begin with a selection of parts considered 
important (humans, animals, buildings, infrastructure, businesses, institutions, 
organisations, communities), assess their degrees of freedom (what they can do), examine 
the feedback between them and see how the social and physical entity ‘city’ emerges 
from and is sustained by that feedback.  We could then continue up and look at the 
feedback between the city and other cities and between cities and larger entities of which 
they are parts e.g., nation-states.  A bottom-up approach  
preserves ‘methodological individualism’ (appropriate to a bottom-up perspective) but  rejects the idea that 
individuals make decision solely according to self-interested (maximising) calculations, and instead models 
individuals as rule followers subject to different types of normative and institutional constraints that apply 
collectively.35 
 
A bottom-up approach also  
 
Reject[s] the methodological holism of sociology but preserves what we may call its ‘ontological holism,’ 
that is the idea that even though collective institutions emerge out of the interactions among individuals, 
once they have formed they take on ‘a life of their own’ (i.e., they are not just reified entities) and affect 
individual action in many different ways.36 
 
                                                 
34 DeLanda, 1000 yrs, 17-18. 
35 DeLanda, 1000 yrs, 19. 
36 DeLanda, 1000 yrs, 19.  
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Real historical processes, like those that build and erode mountains and those that 
discourage and encourage human development, can, to a greater and greater extent, be 
observed using the complex bottom-up simulations that have been made possible by 
computers.  Classic analytical tools (linear equations, for example) do not work for 
nonlinear problems.  However, bottom-up computer simulations do.
37
   
A top-down linear approach begins with a postulated ideal, something reified or 
static, enumerates the components that precede the ideal, and then compares something 
real to the ideal and its list of parts, finding that something’s degree of deviance.  This 
type of approach is “always carried out with reference to something that’s supposed to be 
missing.”38   On the other hand, a bottom-up approach would, for instance, begin with the 
components of an actual essay, look at how they interact, and see if and how a whole 
essay emerges from those interactions.  In this way it becomes clear how what emerges 
does so, but in a way that remains open to other interpretations.    
Arguably, everything we do entails an ideal or goal, or is driven by one.  The 
problem emerges when people do not recognise that goals, like everything else, emerged 
from a contingent historical process.  There are no goals, ends or imperatives that are 
necessary in the ‘natural’ or ‘divine’ sense, that is, that transcend or pre-exist history, as 
was generally thought to be necessary in classical metaphysics.  We can always reassess 
and alter our goals, as well as our necessary presuppositions, like the presupposition that 
                                                 
37 See the introduction to DeLanda, 1000yrs, Manuel DeLanda, War in the Age of 
Intelligent Machines (New York, NY: Zone Books, MIT press, 1991), hereafter WAR, and most 
recently, specifically and completely, Manuel DeLanda, Philosophy and Simulation: The Emergence 
of Synthetic Reason (New York, NY: Continuum, 2011). Hereafter Philosophy & Simulation. 
38 Deleuze, Negotiations, 146. 
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language is everything or the presupposition of a material reality.  Effectively, everything 
is always already a process, and “processes are becomings, and aren’t to be judged by 
some final result but by the way they precede and their power to continue...”39  All we 
can really know about real things is the real interactions (processes) from which the 
unique properties, capacities, and tendencies that identify things emerge.  To understand 
things we need to look at the nonlinear dynamics that create and sustain them. 
 
Nonlinear 
 
As we have seen, according to DeLanda, reality is flows of matter-energy-
information from which entities, existing at varying spatio-temporal scales, emerge as the 
products of concrete historical processes: reality is fluid, creative, and nonlinear.  As he 
writes: 
In a very real sense, reality is ... matter-energy undergoing phase transitions of various kinds, with each 
new layer of accumulated "stuff" simply enriching the reservoir of nonlinear dynamics and nonlinear 
combinatorics available for the generation of novel structures and processes. Rocks and winds, germs and 
words, are all different manifestations of this dynamic material reality, or, in other words, they all represent 
the different ways in which this ... matter-energy[-information] expresses itself.40 
 
This is not reductive because the human social realm of which words, thoughts, and ideas 
are an equally real part is simply one of the ways material reality expresses itself. With 
this in mind we can distinguish between linear and nonlinear historical accounts. 
An historical account is linear when it sees history as a progression toward an 
ideal end, be that end in the present, the past or the future, be it the end of history, be it 
still progressing or be it regressing.  In a linear account of history, the end (the ideal 
                                                 
39 Deleuze, Negotiations, 146. 
40 DeLanda, 1000yrs, 21.   
27 
 
27 
 
telos) is taken as the starting point, consequently what has come before is seen as inferior 
stages progressing toward that end, or regressing from it, as the case may be.  Some 
might want to think of the movement of ‘spirit toward the absolute’ or ‘society toward 
communism’, or some religious population toward some ideal time/place.  Progress (or 
regress) can only be conceived with reference to an ideal.  This is a problem when that 
ideal is imposed as necessary/pre-existing/transcendent/eternal because in so being it is 
not true to reality.   
For linearity, what succeeds is seen to leave behind and be unaffected by what has 
been succeeded.  Some humans tend to see what is ‘new’ or ‘now’ as inherently better 
than what has come before.  Whether they are conscious of it or not this belief is because 
‘now’ is closer to their ‘ideal end’, or in other words, conscious of it or not, these humans 
structure and judge their reality according to an ahistorical ideal, for instance, the 
freedom fighters who crashed aeroplanes on September 11
th
 2001.  Or someone who 
believes that ‘negative’ traits can be attributed to groups of people based on bodily 
pigmentation, proportion and configuration.     
In 1000yrs DeLanda gives us an account of history where there is no ideal telos, 
and development is animated by feedback.  DeLanda:   
…far from advancing in stages of increased perfection … successive emergences [are]… mere 
accumulations of different types of materials, accumulations in which each successive layer does not form 
a new world closed in on itself but, on the contrary, results in coexistences and interactions of different 
kinds… each new layer of accumulated “stuff” simply enrich[ing] the reservoir of nonlinear dynamics and 
nonlinear combinatorics available for the generation of novel structures and processes.41 …each new 
human phase simply add[s] itself to the other ones, coexisting and interacting with them without leaving 
them in the past.42  
   
                                                 
41 DeLanda, 1000 yrs, 21. 
42 DeLanda, 1000 yrs, 16. 
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As an example of development through feedback, we can think of the way philosophical 
concepts are used in the works of individual philosophers, how they incorporate each 
other, interact with each other, distinguish themselves from each other again and again 
and in different ways through the work of other philosophers, unique conceptions 
emerging from the mix.  Some of these others are seen by some to surpass what came 
before.  But these works are then taken back by others to interact with their priors.  We 
continue to read Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and Marx.  The history of philosophy can 
be viewed as a field of interacting ideas.  Its story is one of the influences of these ideas, 
their interaction, and what emerged there from.  Philosophy’s history is not the story of 
ideas surpassing each other, it is the story of a growing field of interacting ideas.     
DeLanda’s thousand year history of the west is such a history.  It tells the story of 
how matter-energy-information-thought has flowed and stabilised in real spaces over real 
durations of time.  It neither merely describes what there has been nor deduces it as 
necessary from some transcendent ideal (or one being pursued by a great human); it tries 
to explain how things happen and what spaces for further activity there might be.  Here is 
an example of DeLanda's nonlinear history: 
Cities began to change under the influence of these new nodes.  New York and Chicago in 
particular experienced an intense electrification and metallisation, which resulted in the birth of 
the skyscraper, an original urban form unique to the United States, prior to World War II. The iron 
frame, which allowed masonry walls to be replaced with glass, had been pioneered in European 
cities such as London and Paris.  But it was in America that this metallic endoskeleton evolved 
into the skyscraper.  Electric motors in turn allowed elevators to transport people vertically 
through these huge towers.  Chicago pioneered the use of steel and electricity in the construction 
industry, catalyzed by the great fire of 1871, which destroyed the city’s commercial center literally 
cleared the way for innovative building techniques to be applied.  By the 1890s, Chicago was the 
world capital of the skyscraper, with New York a close second.  But its electricity and steel acted 
as centripetal forces, making possible the intense human and machine concentrations represented 
by the new megacities, the internal combustion engine and the automobile had a centrifugal effect, 
allowing people to move out of central cities into rapidly growing suburban areas.43 
 
                                                 
43 DeLanda, 1000 yrs, 92 
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DeLanda describes some of what there is and how it came to be, how it had affect and 
was affected once actualised, without any reference to an ideal, a purpose, or a final 
cause, just difference, process, and change, material flows of humans, electricity, and 
metal.  Nonlinear history does not see progress but does see “strong mutual interactions 
(or feedback)…between components.”44 DeLanda is promoting real historical processes 
over ideal historical progress.  Each of the aspects of the social/geophysical structures 
described in the above quotation developed contingently, and each upon emerging 
interacted with what was already here, in all cases preparing the way for new 
developments; new coherent structures without a transcendent telos; in many ways 
without intentional human design, at least without a grand pre-existing plan, just a 
contingent assemblage of knowledge, matter, skills, and space.    
In the introduction to 1000yrs DeLanda offers the ‘classical’ (pre-nonlinear) 
theories of Thermodynamics and Evolution as examples of linearity in science.  He does 
this to illustrate the way of thinking whose prioritisation is a problem.  The ‘classical’ 
theories admitted only one possible historical outcome; “optimal design or optimal 
distribution of energy represented an end of history for these theories.”45 However, in the 
case of biology, 
As [it] begins to include … nonlinear dynamical phenomena in its models—for example the mutual 
stimulation involved in the case of evolutionary “arms races” between predator and prey—the notion of a 
fittest design loses its meaning.46  
 
So without historically necessary outcomes how do we think about reality, about how it 
moves, and how it changes?  DeLanda highlights three ways of thinking, or explanatory 
                                                 
44 DeLanda, 1000 yrs, 14. 
45 DeLanda, 1000 yrs, 13-14. 
46 DeLanda, 1000 yrs, 14. 
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strategies.  1. From, among others, chemistry and contemporary thermodynamics 
DeLanda draws intensive thinking (gradients /productive difference/dynamic tension 
animating processes, and bifurcation).
 47
   In general terms, intensive thinking is thinking 
about things being animated by differences, like the difference between hot and cold air 
animating convection currents.  It also gives us bifurcation, which essentially captures 
that at critical thresholds matter-energy-information-thought can abruptly jump from one 
relatively stable state to another, for instance, water to ice.  These thresholds, or better, 
what emerges from the process of emerging from crossing one of these thresholds are 
infinitely sensitive to the conditions at a critical point in the crossing.  Infinitesimal 
differences in conditions can have a large impact on outcomes, making perfect prediction 
effectively impossible.  The concept of bifurcation further weakens the idea that we can 
say anything necessarily about the future, though we can with ever more detailed and 
complex simulations make very probable claims (barring a bifurcation).    
2. In addition to intensive thinking he takes the idea of population thinking from 
evolutionary biology and mathematics.  Population thinking entails the idea of adaptive 
                                                 
47 More will be said about and by using these concepts, but for now an orienting quote from 
DeLanda: 
Deleuze replaces the false genesis implied by ... pre-existing forms which remain the same for all 
time, with a theory of morphogenesis based on the notion of the different. He conceives difference 
not negatively, as lack of resemblance, but positively or productively, as that which drives a 
dynamical process. The best examples are intensive differences, the differences in temperature, 
pressure, speed, and chemical concentration, which are key to the scientific explanation of the 
genesis of the form of inorganic crystals, or of the forms of organic plants and animals.  (DeLanda, 
ISVP,  5-6)  Gradient is a compact term for “the capacity of intensive differences to act as energy 
storage devices” (DeLanda, Philosophy & Simulation, 9). 
 
I consider dynamic tension to be an analogous concept in Russon.  
Bifurcation will be discussed further in a later section. 
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change through the sorting of variably replicating populations, which entails the idea that 
everything at all scales exists in populations.  
3. From topology he takes ‘topological thinking’ which entails non-metric (so 
beyond our direct experience) spaces of possibility where we can view immanent patterns 
of becoming.  These spaces have as many dimensions as the things being studied have 
important degrees of freedom.  From here we also get the idea that things can be grouped 
in highly variable populations based on invariance over a specific range of 
transformations.   
John Protevi summarises the key ideas discussed thus far very clearly:   
All of ... [this] depends on accepting the strong case put forth [by DeLanda] in  ISVP that 
Deleuze's project in Difference and Repetition 48 and The Logic of Sense49 - continued in the 
collaborative works with Guattari - establishes the ontology of a world able to yield the results 
forthcoming in complexity theory. ... complexity theory models material systems using the 
techniques of nonlinear dynamics, which, by means of showing the topological features of 
manifolds (the distribution of 'singularities') affecting a series of trajectories in a phase space, 
reveals the patterns (shown by 'attractors' in the models), thresholds ('bifurcators' in the models), 
and the necessary intensity of triggers (events that move systems to a threshold activating a 
pattern) of these systems. By showing the spontaneous appearance of indicators of patterns and 
thresholds in the models of the behaviour of complex systems, complexity theory enables us to 
think material systems in terms of their powers of immanent self-organisation.  
There are four main benefits here. (1) The first is the critique of hylomorphism, that is, 
the notion that matter is chaotic or passive and so in need of rescue (by means of the laws of God, 
or a transcendental subject, or the scientific project) to provide it with order or novelty. (2) We can 
thus avoid the issue of reduction to physics, the science whose laws predict the behaviour of 
'matter' at its simplest. (3) Furthermore, by modeling the negative and positive feedback 
mechanisms characteristic of complex systems, complexity theory thereby enables us to ground 
the concept of emergence in the effects of such mechanisms.50 (4) And as a last benefit, 
complexity theory enables us to dispense with the false problem of ‘downward causation’ by 
                                                 
48 Gilles Deleuze. Difference and Repetition. 1968. Translated by Paul Patton. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994). Hereafter D&R. 
49 Gilles Deleuze. The Logic of Sense. 1969. Translated by Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, ed. 
Constantin V. Boundas. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990). 
50 Silberstein & McGeever, SOE, 197.  Here cited by Protevi. 
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showing that the constraints of a pattern, described by an attractor, are not a case of efficient 
causality, but instead need to be thought of as a ‘quasi-cause’.51  
    
For DeLanda, Deleuze’s singularity and importance lies in making these three 
ways of thinking interact.  Something he first did explicitly in D&R.  These sciences and 
mathematics of complexity and chaos have shown us that equilibrium and predictable 
linear causality are special ideal cases and that most of reality most of the time operates 
far from equilibrium and, and so as a nonlinear system.
 52
  For DeLanda one of the 
outcomes has been an epistemological shift, that is, a shift in explanatory strategies or 
how problems and solutions are understood. 
 
Well-Posed Problems 
 
Linear analysis seeks solutions that permanently solve problems, but this limits us 
to problems of a specific kind, generally unremarkable, uninteresting, and unimportant 
ones. Where nonlinear synthesis deals with “…well-posed problems… [that] do not 
disappear behind their solutions, just like virtual multiplicities [universal singularities] do 
not disappear behind actualised individuals.”53  Although DeLanda does not remark upon 
                                                 
51 John Protevi, "Deleuze, Guattari, and Emergence," Paragraph: A Journal of Modern Critical 
Theory, 29.2 (July 2006): pp. 19-39, p. 19-20 (hereafter DGE).   
See also DeLanda, ISVP, 80, 110, 126, where quasi-causes are discussed and said to replace final causes.  
52              A … distinction: complexity theory is not chaos theory. Chaos theory treats the growth 
of unpredictable behaviour from simple rules in deterministic nonlinear dynamical systems, while 
complexity theory treats the emergence of relatively simple functional structures from complex 
interchanges of the component parts of a system. (Protevi, DGE, 21) 
 
Another distinction is that chaos, in its contemporary technical sense, is not randomness, it has a 
complex fractal order.   
53 DeLanda, ISVP, 135.  Further DeLanda:  
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the connection, it is clear that ethics is a field that can benefit from his idea of posing 
problems in a way that allows for unanticipated, creative solutions.  I will return to this 
point below.   
Posing problems well is about picking remarkable, interesting, and important 
problems for which the solutions have not already been decided in advance.  Speaking of 
scientific experiments, DeLanda writes:  
[Scientific experiment is now about] the distribution of the important and the unimportant defining 
an experimental problem (what degrees of freedom matter, what disturbances do not make a 
difference) [which] are not grasped at a glance the way one is supposed to grasp an essence (or a 
clear and distinct idea), but slowly brought to light as the assemblage stabilises itself through the 
mutual accommodation of its heterogeneous components.54 
 
DeLanda gets around the whole reductionism question by “proposing a Deleuzean 
epistemology that redefines science from the search for laws in nature to the search for 
topological regularities in scientific fields, or as he puts it, the distribution of singular and 
ordinary points in a problem.”55  These regularities, remember, do not limit the field of 
                                                                                                                                                 
As I discussed in Chapter 4, problems are not reducible to their solutions but rather 
are defined by their conditions: a given distribution of the singular and the ordinary, the 
important and the unimportant. As such, problems are inherently "obscure yet distinct" and 
only acquire clarity in the process which progressively specifies each of their solutions 
(DeLanda, ISVP, 220). 
 
... I used as a guiding constraint the avoidance of the categories of typological thought: 
resemblance, identity, analogy and contradiction. But I could have as well said that what guides 
this construction is the avoidance of the image of thought implied by these categories: "a natural 
capacity for thought endowed with a capacity for truth or an affinity with the true ..." [Deleuze, 
D&R, 131]. This image ... has the result of turning the plane of immanence [the virtual space 
created by the presuppositions entailed by one’s concepts] into a plane of transcendence. Or ... to 
trap philosophy within the plane of reference, linking it to linguistic propositions which are either 
true of or false of their referents. This manoeuvre ... closes the road to the virtual or the 
problematic. [However] if ... the image of thought leads to a plane of immanence, then philosophy 
"does not consist in knowing and it is not inspired by truth. Rather it is categories like Interesting, 
Remarkable, or Important that determine success or failure" [Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. 
What Is Philosophy. 1991. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson, and Graham Burchell. (New York, 
NY: Columbia University Press, 1994), 82. (hereafter WIP)]. (DeLanda, ISVP, 221) 
 
54DeLanda, ISVP, 177.  
55 Protevi, DGE, 38 n. 6. 
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possibility in any absolute or deterministic way, but instead are the ground from which 
novelty emerges. 
The same can be said about the problems of living and building the human world.  
Skyscrapers and cars, to return to the examples above, emerged as solutions to the ‘well-
posed problem’ of urban life in a specific space-time, but far from permanently solving 
the problem they drove the development of novel formulations of the well-posed problem 
of life and the development of further novel solutions and formulations.  Cars and 
skyscrapers emerged from the interaction of people, networks, organisations, 
corporations and many other things and they each, once born, brought people and other 
intensive flows together in novels ways.  Unanticipated new problems and unanticipated 
new goals emerged.  Out of those novel combinations came other novel emergences, like 
the interstate system and the elevator, and new goals like hitchhiking and elevator sex, 
and so other novel combinations and still more emergences, intensities change and 
bifurcations are crossed, ad infinitum.  Deleuze concludes: “That’s what it’s like on the 
plane of immanence: multiplicities fill it, singularities connect with one another, 
processes or becomings unfold, intensities rise and fall.”56  
Well-posed problems thus enable people to discover regularities and patterns, but 
equally to respond to these regularities and patterns creatively.  Well-posed problems are 
part and parcel of DeLanda’s overall ontology.  Here again we see the importance of a 
definite perspective on the structure and dynamics of the natural world for our 
understanding of the social world, and ultimately of the ethical principles that can best 
govern individual experiments in living within it.  Alternative worldviews, either idealist 
                                                 
56 Deleuze, Negotiations, 146-7. 
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or physicalist, run the risk of dogmatism.  I will examine the problem of dogmatism in 
linear thinking in the next section. 
 
The Dogmatic Image of Dichotomous Linear Thinking 
 Todd may, commenting on Deleuze, says of the nature of dogmatism: 
What is the dogmatic image of thought?57  It is not the possession of a few philosophers, 
ensconced in their offices, alone with their ideas.  Nor is it a treatise to be found in a dusty library, 
an arcane or secret program that has been passed down to generations in some sort of intellectual 
conspiracy.  The dogmatic image of thought is ours.  It is our template for conceiving the world.58 
The dogmatic image of thought perceives a universe composed solely of physical entities in more 
or less predictable relationships with one another, a humanity characterised by narrow norms of 
behaviour, a realm of entities rigidly demarcated from one another: these are worlds that constrict 
rather than widen the question of how one might live.59 
 
The dogmatic image of thought is our habitual way of thinking; it is what we imagine 
thinking to be, reified as what it necessarily is to think; it is the form of thinking, which 
has contingently emerged, that has come to be taken as what it necessarily is to think.  
One can also call Deleuze’s dogmatic image of thought dichotomous thinking or linear- 
static thinking.   
Elizabeth Grosz, articulating the Derridian concept of dichotomous thinking, says:  
Dichotomous thinking necessarily hierarchizes and ranks the two polarized terms so that one becomes the 
privileged term and the other its suppressed, subordinated, negative counterpart.60  The subordinated term is 
merely the negation the denial, the absence or privation of the primary term, its fall from grace; the primary 
term defines itself by expelling its other and in this process establishes its own boundaries and borders to 
create an identity for itself.61 
                                                 
 
57 For more detail see, Chapter 3 of D&R, and Chapter 2 of W IP. 
58 Todd May, Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction (New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 74.   
59 May, Gilles Deleuze, 17. 
60 Here Elizabeth Grosz cites Jacque Derrida simply by name. 
61 Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward A Corporeal Feminism (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1994), 3.  
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I hold that the fundamental dichotomy of the dogmatic image of thought is the ideal/real 
dichotomy, where the ideal is the primary term of the dichotomy and the real is the 
secondary or subordinate term.  An important, problematic, ontological ideal that gets 
plugged into our ideal/real dichotomous template is the static linear nature of the world.  
This structure of thought precludes grasping the real’s nonlinear fluidity.  A crucial task 
for my argument is to show the inadequacy of this ideal.  DeLanda’s nonlinear history, as 
explored in 1000yrs, and his realist assemblage theory approach to social ontology in A 
New Philosophy of Society provide the basis for this argument.
 62
   
Under the dogmatic image of thought we conceive the world on the basis of pre-
given ideals, which unduly limits the field of reality to that which accords with the ideal.  
Real possibilities which do not conform to the ideal are excluded, impeding our ability to 
experiment and create.   Seeing the world as static leads us to look for necessary ideals 
towards which we must progress.  If the world and humans are necessarily always 
already a certain way there must be one best and right way for humans to live.  However, 
in reality the world and humans are not always already a certain way, and so there is no 
one best and right way to live, where ‘best’ means ‘conformity to an abstract ideal’.  In a 
creative reality, the best way to live is creatively, as I will explain more fully in the final 
chapter.
63
  Belief in such ways has led to events like the holocaust and the Rwandan 
                                                 
62 Manuel DeLanda, A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage theory and Social 
Complexity (New York, NY: Continuum, 2006). Hereafter New Philosophy of Society. 
63 I am not arguing for a pluralistic free for all, however wide the parameters may be the space of 
possible lives is parameterised.  However multiple the realisations there is an immanent pattern that is 
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genocides, as those who do not conform to the ideal are liquidated because they do not 
(cannot) conform.   
DeLanda’s ontology and its nonlinear bottom-up approach dissolve the ideal/real 
dichotomy by establishing fluidity (nonlinearity) and feedback (complex mutual 
interaction) within and across scales.  While DeLanda does not explicitly draw ethical 
conclusions, his critique of dogmatically linear thinking prepares the ground for my 
ethics of experimentation.  It does so by undercutting the ontological grounds for 
regulatory ideals that would dogmatically prescribe one way of being as ultimately best.   
It does not tell us how we should live, but opens the problem of how one might live.  
Note that the question is formulated as ‘how one might live’ rather than how we might 
live.  ‘One’ can be a person but can also be a species, a city, a planet, a rock, an atom, or 
a word.  Things like atoms, rocks, and words are what Deleuze would call nonorganic 
life.  These things, although neither organic nor biological, are on the same ontological 
plane as everything else insofar as all is creative complexity driven by difference.  They, 
like organic life, live in variably replicative populations, are sorted, emerge, and are 
sustained, by processes of interaction animated by difference.  They too interact and give 
birth to things beyond themselves.  It is this immanent life (creativity) that replaces 
transcendent causes like essences or god.  If matter did not do this on its own we would 
not be here to pose the problem.  While it does not make sense to ask of an atom how it 
might live in the same way one might ask a human, it does make sense to ask what any 
individual atom might become.  The answer is that it might become any number of things 
                                                                                                                                                 
supportive of the best for most.  The parameters are determined by the broadest, least actually determining, 
material (physical and social) human life requirements.      
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depending upon the assemblages it is capable of forming with other atoms.  Nature is 
creative, in other words, and we can learn from this creativity.    
  Thus, when faced with the question of how we should live our genuine 
development, one of critical self-transformation toward a greater degree of mutual equal 
recognition (self-identity, authenticity), is arrested.  Simply put, this development is 
arrested because we cannot reconcile the discrepancy between our real lives (and what it 
might be) and the ideal life imposed as necessary.  As a result some tend to just get 
through the day, in some cases with the promise of an ideal after life.  
 Repeatedly asking how we should live has produced a succession of ideals that 
appear to be progressive when they are analysed top-down with reference to the current 
ideal at the top, be it ‘god’, ‘good’, ‘utopia’, ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’, ‘individuality’, or 
‘success’.  The point is not that these ideals in themselves are bad but rather that when 
what they are, how they manifest, how they are understood and enacted, is taken as 
necessary rather than contingent and malleable, that problems of limitation arise.   
Similarly, today’s choices of jeans, dish soap, window coverings and toothpaste, 
limit the idea of freedom to consumer choice.  This freedom is just our simple freedom to 
choose, not complex freedom to choose what we choose.  This simple freedom is not 
placed into a dichotomous hierarchy with complex freedom; the only aim is to give each 
their due, to prioritise neither over the other.  Our current world seems to be a world 
where many do not take on the responsibility entailed in their freedom to choose.  That is 
the responsibility to learn about reality so that better choices can be made, perpetually 
producing better choices to be made.  Our complex freedom emerges from our simple 
freedom, but has emergent properties, capacities and tendencies of its own.  From making 
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choices in the world emerges making choices that will affect the range of available 
choices.  A loss of complex freedom is one way to articulate having our development 
arrested by false teleology and its ideals.   
Marriage, for instance, is commonly held as an ideal human relationship, but in 
reality there are many types of marriages and relationships that are all, at least as, perhaps 
more, fulfilling and ‘functional’ than a given ideal form of marriage.  There are also 
forms of relationship that exist in the virtual realm that might be actualised, but as long as 
we think with reference to an imposed ideal rather than the real and the goals that emerge 
from it, many of these other ways of (experiments in) relating will remain unactualised.
 64
   
Thinking with reference to a specific form of marriage as an ideal can lead a 
grandmother to feel bad for her content and developing granddaughter simply because 
she is not married and procreating.  Simultaneously, it can take away from the 
granddaughter’s contentment and the development of what she might be because she 
knows she is disappointing, saddening or worrying her grandmother.  This ideal 
decreases the mutuality and equality of the recognition between them and the overall 
degree of it in each of their lives.    
                                                 
64 The virtual (to be discussed further in dedicated sections to follow) is drawn from the intensive, 
population, and topological thinking with previously discussed.  In brief:   
… the virtual is the realm of patterns and thresholds, that is, those multiplicities, Ideas, or abstract 
machines that structure the intensive morphogenetic processes that produce actual systems and 
their behaviours. A behaviour pattern, or a threshold at which a behaviour pattern is triggered, 
needs to be ontologically distinguished (or 'modally' distinguished) from behavior … Thus 
patterns and thresholds are virtual, while behaviour is actual. An event, in creating new patterns 
and thresholds, restructures the virtual. (Protevi, DGE, 25)   
 
As knew elements were born during the formation of the Universe virtual possibility spaces (phase spaces) 
were also born.  
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Those in relationships that differ from the imposed ideal are recognised by the 
others who dogmatically subscribe to the ideal, but only as degrees of deviance from the 
norm.  Marriage and procreation can emerge purely as a feeling of obligation to others.  
This fact however, does not diminish the feeling that the obligation is a real demand.  
This demand is made by those whose recognition we require to confirm our own 
recognition of ourselves as a self-conscious human; we need what we are conscious of 
confirmed (the degree varies).  Marriage, when it is the object of dichotomous thinking, 
becomes the pull of an ideal rather than something humans are immanently driven 
towards.  Pull refers to that of an obligation, as distinct from the drive of immanent 
responsibilities and desires, things as much felt as reasoned to be what we want and need.  
What we are actually driven towards, what we actually recognise and how we want to be 
recognised are obscured by the reified ideal.  As we can see, what matters from the 
DeLandian perspective is not conformity to an ideal, but the possibility of creating a 
stable assemblage (a freely negotiated relationship).  Unlike in nature, however, where 
stability depends upon unconscious bonds, stability of social and individual experiments 
depends upon the recognition of others.  The ethics of experimentation that I am building 
does not predicate recognition on conformity to an ideal, but simply on whether the 
experiment works for those directly involved in it as a possible way of being that does not 
impede any other person’s way of being human. 
When we judge with reference to an ideal, by contrast, deviation from that ideal to 
a degree beyond the range of tolerance appears to be a deviation from what it is to be 
human according to those doing the judging.  May articulates this as follows: 
If homosexuality is abnormal, it is an abnormality that swallows up the rest of one’s existence; 
every gesture, every emotion is reducible to the core fact of the homosexuality.  That is why it 
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seems so important to intervene.  What is at stake is not simply a deviant form of activity; it is a 
deviant form of life.65 
 
The dogmatic image of thought and its prioritisation of linear top-down analyses with 
reference to imposed ideals encourage these non-mutual and non-equal forms of 
recognition and arrest genuine development.  
In reality, treating experiments in living as deviations from an ideal tends to lead 
to reactionary or resentful responses or recognitions.  Instead, we can recognise what 
happens just as something that happened as the result of a process.  If we do or do not 
like a happening, then we can seek to understand its process so that we can encourage or 
discourage its happening accordingly.   If we do not like people flying aeroplanes into 
buildings then we can try to understand the conditions that support people choosing to do 
so and work toward changing those conditions.  The same can be said regarding starving 
and diseased populations (from fungi to humans) around the world.   
Let me take another example.  It is not important that the Greeks invented western 
philosophy, it is important that it emerged from the interaction of humans in a situation. 
The crucial questions are: what are the processes of its emergence, maintenance and 
development, what are the interacting parts of the assemblage, what brought them 
together and what are the differences that sustain their interaction, and not, ‘how did this 
assemblage follow from a pre-given regulatory ideal?’ 
 Genuine development, as has been indicated and as I will elaborate upon in the 
final chapter, is development toward a greater degree of mutual equal recognition for all, 
entailing a more experimental approach to goal-setting and living.  So where might this 
abstract goal exist in DeLanda’s reality, given that it does not contain a transcendent 
                                                 
65 May, Gilles Deleuze, 10.  
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realm?  The short answer is the realm of immanent patterns of becoming, or the 
immanent patterns of the processes by which things emerge and that sustain them as 
actual entities, e.g. the metabolic circuits that sustain biological life.  The next section 
will deal directly with this realm of patterns called the virtual.      
 
The Virtual 
 
For DeLanda, the general and the particular are replaced by the Deleuzean 
concepts universal singular and individual singular.  This does not, for example, map 
onto the division species (general) and organism (particular).  As we have seen both 
species and organism are on the same ontological plane; they are both historically 
actualised individual singularities.  Individual entities or emergences are not identified as 
particular manifestations of general categories.  They are the unique actualisations of 
concrete processes identified by their emergent properties, capacities, and tendencies, all 
of which are universal singularities that are shared by populations.  They are points or 
areas in the phase space (possibility space) of a given population that the members of that 
population tend towards.   
A phase space is an imaginary space with as many dimensions as 'interesting' variables of a 
system; the choice of variables obviously depends on the interests of the modeller. The phase 
space model is constructed using a manifold, an n-dimensional mathematical object. The manifold 
qua phase space represents the range of behaviour open to the system: 'what a body can do'.
 66 
 
These universal singularities are not causal essences or forms, i.e., not the essence of 
Raven which causes all Ravens to be Ravens as a more or less ideal manifestation of the 
essence.  The patterns of the virtual are quasi-causes, that is, these patterns, whatever 
                                                 
66 Protevi, DGE, 21. 
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they are (our current list is short), occurring in the flows of matter-energy-information-
thought, actualise what there is, but not resemble what there is, as emergent from them.  
Though short the list may be, it certainly, through multi-realisability, in a sense explains, 
a good bit of reality.  The patterns of the virtual are quasi-causal insofar as they do not 
directly determine all the unique detailed features of a given actual thing.  If they did 
there would be a completely unique pattern for each individual thing or kind, they would 
be essences.  Instead, these patters define a space of possibility in which an unpredictable 
number of different concrete realisations emerge. 
Universal singularities exist in the no less real realm of the virtual.  Universal 
singularities can be thought of as diagrams (in the case of the non-biological) and body 
plans (in the case of the biological).  They are also, importantly, a space of possibilities 
structured by certain parameters (degrees of freedom), thresholds of change 
(bifurcations), and identifiable patterns (attractors).
67
  A possibility space, the parameters, 
the bifurcations and the attractors are each universal singularities and together a universal 
singularity, much like each human is an individual singularity and part of the individual 
singularities like friend groups and the human species.  The parameters are the 
boundaries of the space and the attractors and bifurcations structure the space.  Attractors 
and bifurcations manifest as the properties, capacities and tendencies, immanent to the 
interacting matter-energy-information-thought.  They are actualised at certain intensities, 
always with a degree of variability, and so uniquely identify the actual individual 
singularities.      
                                                 
67 Attractors will be more fully explored in a dedicated section to come. 
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A relatively simple example of this, used by DeLanda, is that hurricanes, without 
metaphor, embody or actualise the same diagram (universal singularity) as a steam motor.  
They are both animated by the same gradients.
68
   They are both quasi-caused by a certain 
pattern that is variably actualised given a range of certain materials at a certain range of 
intensities.  These real virtual patterns are emergent, that is, immanent to the interaction 
of difference, and it is from them that the rich variety of actual reality emerges.  His point 
is to describe and explain the real processes from which what there is emerges, not just 
establish that there are processes and then metaphorically apply a conceptualised process 
to establish a logical model on which to found prescriptions for how we should live, or to 
argue for the practical perpetuation of the same, or the realisation of the inevitable.  
DeLanda’s writes: 
When we say (as Marxists used to say) that "class struggle is the motor of history" we are using 
the word "motor" in a purely metaphorical sense. However, when we say that "a hurricane is a 
steam motor" we are not simply making a linguistic analogy; rather, we are saying that hurricanes 
embody the same diagram used by engineers to build steam motors—that is, we are saying that a 
hurricane, like a steam engine, contains a reservoir of heat, operates via thermal differences, and 
circulates energy and materials through a carnot cycle. (Of course, we may be wrong in ascribing 
this diagram to a hurricane, and further empirical research may reveal that hurricanes in fact 
operate in a different way, according to a different diagram.)69 
  
Each hurricane is a unique actualisation of a universal singularity (a space of possibilities 
structured by certain parameters, bifurcations, and attractors), one, as it currently appears 
to our empirical understanding, that when diagramed has a significantly similarly 
structured possibility space to that of the steam motors that humans have made.  In the 
                                                 
68 Here is a list of gradients at different scales and within different assemblages:  gradients of 
energy, of matter, of information,  of fitness, of gains from trade, of human or other resources, of 
legitimacy, of subjective states, of solidarity, of status, to name a few of the effectively infinite gradients of 
reality.  See: DeLanda, Philosophy & Simulation. 
69 DeLanda, 1000yrs, 58-59 
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same way, each human is a unique actualisation of an equally unique body plan 
(universal singularity), one that is shared by many actual individuals that to varying 
degrees share properties, capacities and tendencies.  Although given the individuals and 
intensities that surround a given individual, which of each of these are actualised in what 
combination can and does vary widely (another scale of variation) even within 
reproductively isolated species.  How actual individuals are grouped depends on which 
ones of each of these three are selected as relevant to the study being undertaken.  
For instance, a whale, a human and a bird are but very few of those that can be 
considered to actualise the body plan that is called chordata.  A significant amount of the 
biological life on Earth is a topological transformation of this body plan.  This body plan 
is the assemblage of the properties, capacities and tendencies of certain materials placed 
into certain interactions.  Given this variety of actualisation, the virtual capacities of an 
individual singularity, and more so of a universal singularity, are effectively infinite (a 
parameterised infinity, given the matter-energy-information-thought involved and what is 
immanent to it), although temporally finite (at least for the foreseeable future), especially 
in the case of individual biological organisms.  The parameters are not imposed on the 
matter involved; the matter involved entails its own parameters given what it is and what 
it can do in concert with what it interacts with.  
As mentioned, the differences between actual entities that share a universal 
singularity are only topological transformations of that universal singularity.  This one 
way to group entities, that is, to parameterise the space of possibilities with the ‘laws’ of 
topology, which is a geometry of non-metric n-dimensional shapes in non-metric n-
dimensional spaces.  From this view, the universal singularity is what remains unchanged 
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or invariant through transformations; through all its multiple-realisations.  However these 
transformations are limited (the aforementioned ‘laws’) or there would be no way to 
group things.  Topological transformations exclude cutting and gluing, they include 
stretching, compressing, and folding.  The classic example is that, topologically, a donut 
and a coffee cup are the same shape, or share the same topological invariances; one can 
be transformed into the other without cutting or making new connections.  Universal 
singularities are points of topological invariance shared by populations of actual entities.  
Between the shape that represents a whale and that which represents a human 
topologically, although very different will share points of invariance, these are the 
universal singularities shared by humans and whales.  These bound a particular space or 
universal singularity, but the space of each is one in its own right made up of others that 
it shares with other species, those it shares only with its species, those only with its 
genetic and social lineages, and those unique to the individual.  Things like the need for 
quality nourishment, shelter and clothing founded on, encouraged by, and satisfying of 
our need for each other socially, are the topological invariants of human life when viewed 
as material in phase space.  
It will be asked, is this not the reintroduction of essences?  In a sense yes, except 
these are not eternal, they are historically produced emergences which do not resemble 
the actual entities that actualise them.  I do not know the exact history, for instance, of the 
‘torus’ (one of the patterns [attractors] found to recur in phase space), but there is the 
history of the matter-energy-information-thought in the known Universe, and as new 
elements emerged and interacted in different ways, there would have been a moment 
when the torus pattern first emerged as actualised in certain material.  Recall that these 
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virtual patterns are immanent to actual material; the virtual is not reducible to the actual, 
but it requires the actual.  Also the torus pattern as something recognised by humans 
emerged in a specific space-time.  Thus, the virtual is patterns that define a field of 
possibility in which real things emerge.  At this point then, we must turn to the crucial 
discussion of the forces that drive interaction of elements, the patterns they give rise to, 
and thus the emergence of actual things. 
 
The Intensive  
 
The virtual is reality’s immanent patterns of organisation; it is the ways that 
matter behaves when animated by intensive gradients, given what that matter actually is, 
in given real cases.  Gradients are intensive differences in things like temperature, 
chemical concentration, and density.  They animate the flows of matter-energy-
information-thought out of which the entities that inhabit the reality we are aware of are 
assembled, given the parameters of the virtual that are immanent to those flows. In other 
words, “virtual multiplicities (viewed as self-posed ontological problems) depend on 
intensive assemblages like ecosystems to progressively give rise to ontological 
solutions,” like orchids and wasps.70 There are virtual problems in the human realm as 
well.  For example, humans cohabitating generates virtual problems of relationship 
negotiation, but these problems are not instances of ideal types, but follow from the fact 
that human beings cohabitate.   
                                                 
70 DeLanda, ISVP, 177. 
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The intensive is that which animates matter-energy-information-thought.  There is 
an isomorphism between the patterns generated by systems animated by intensive 
differences and patterns produced in other complex systems.  Isomorphism captures 
something similar to multi-realisability.  For instance, there is isomorphism between 
patterns observable in things like the internet, computer simulations, human 
transportation, and the weather.  Consider the chemical gradients that animate the 
development of ovum.  DeLanda on embryogenesis:   
The egg … possesses an obscure yet distinct structure defined by zones of biochemical 
concentration and by polarities established by the asymmetrical position of the yolk (or nucleus).  
But even though it does possess the necessary biochemical materials and genetic information, 
these materials and information do not contain a clear and distinct blueprint of the final 
organism.71  [But]… a gene encodes for a messenger RNA in nurse cells when translated form a 
protein and this protein forms a gradient in the egg, where the concentration dictates body regions, 
head, thorax and abdomen.72   
 
Again, I want to stress the role of creative and unpredictable outcomes.  There are only 
quasi-causal patterns, not absolute determination of outcome, whether in nature or 
society. 
The intensive as animator or process and change is open to greater or lesser 
degrees of intentionality in the emergence of novel virtualities (problems), and thus also 
novel responses.  This is significant for history and emergent goals because human social 
life, although it does generate its own directionality, is ultimately responsive to conscious 
decision-making.  If it were not, ethics would be inconceivable, and therefore, so too my 
                                                 
71 DeLanda, ISVP, 16.  See also, Vladimir Glisin, “Molecular Biology in Embryology. “The Sea 
Urchin Embryo”, in Self-Organizing Systems. The Emergence of Order, ed. Eugene Yates (Plenum, New 
York 1987), 163, cited by DeLanda regarding this.    
72 Robert W. Korn. “The Emergence Principle in Biological Hierarchies.” Biology and Philosophy 
20 (2005): 137-151, pp. 140. 
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ethics of experimentation (conscious creation of new possibilities for living).  Different 
emergent goals are possible for us depending upon how we understand the natural and 
social worlds of which we are a part.  We can, as DeLanda does, look at the rise and fall 
of particular populations in terms of things like the intensity of trade allowed by the 
intensity of connection allowed by the intensity, frequency, and shape of air and sea 
currents between particular locations and populations.  Underlying material patterns 
generate pressures and opportunities, but what actually happens depends also on the 
choices people within these patterns make in response to these pressures.   Reality, for 
DeLanda, that which actually happens in any given context, is the outcome of the 
interaction between the virtual and the intensive.   
 
The Virtual The Intensive and The Actual: Reality 
 
A bottom-up approach can show us “… intensive processes which generate actual 
forms … [and that] concrete mechanisms of immanence explain … how the virtual is 
produced out of the actual.”73 These mechanisms are simply and amazingly what happens 
when different things interact.  As much as the virtual is the plans, the quasi-cause, for 
what might be actual, the virtual is immanent to the actual; “echoing without resembling 
each other”.74  DeLanda: 
... in ... [this] ontology there exist two histories, one actual and one virtual, having complex 
interactions with one another. On one hand there is a historical series of actual events genetically 
involved in the production of other events, and on the other, an equally historical series of ideal 
                                                 
73 DeLanda, ISVP, 88. 
74 Deleuze, D&R, 189. 
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events defining an objective realm of virtual problems of which each actualised individual is but a 
specific solution.75 
 
Human history encodes infinite possibilities for realisation; actual history is the path 
actually taken, the ethics of experimentation seeks out paths not taken but virtually 
present for actualisation of we so choose.   
Let us take the example of this thesis.  The interactions of me, my advisor, and 
many other things including flows of biomass, electricity, and language, actualised this 
thesis as symbols printed on paper and bound in pleather.  The interaction of these actual 
things, the assemblage of their degrees of freedom, produced the space of possibilities 
within which the thesis emerged.  The shape of that space, the trajectories of the things 
interacting in that space, and where and how those trajectories gather and stabilise is the 
virtual diagram of the thesis (though actually mapping a space this complex is currently 
still beyond our technical skill.  These areas of gathering or stabilisation are the attractors 
of the space.  Among others, these attractors are actualised in sleeping, eating, working, 
recreating, linguistic, seasonal, and social patterns.  The space of the thesis, though 
perhaps less importantly, perhaps still interestingly, also has areas involving things like 
meteorological, climatic, and geological patterns.    
One way attractors can be identified is by their temporal manifestation.  They can 
be steady, periodic, or chaotic.  Another way is identifying them in terms of flow.  These 
flows can be laminar, wavy, or turbulent.  Each of these has a basic form in topological 
phase space, a point, a circle, and a complex fractal shape, respectively.   
Knowing about the above distinctions between different attractors adds detail to 
viewing things in terms of phase space.  In the space of the thesis one could think about 
                                                 
75 DeLanda, ISVP, 188. 
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the different attractors for the different flows involved.  Being aware of these universal 
but still singular patterns allows us a different way of understanding and perhaps 
controlling the patterns of our lives.  Having this way of distinguishing things adds itself 
to our other ways, and can help us understand and so design the systems and outputs we 
do, in more detailed, controlled, and experimental ways.  One might consider things 
quasi-caused by chaotic attractors interesting and important and so in the processes of 
writing something intentionally move their sleep cycle and other life patterns away from 
previously stable patterns.   Or observing themselves they may notice that when in a 
processes of writing they tend to move away from regularity, and so, chose to take steps 
to maintain regularity.  Attractors give us another way to think about these things.  
Thinking this way can help you to look at the real patterns in your life.  How do you 
really spend your space-time?  What really composes your space-times and in what 
ways?  Be real about it.  I argue that having the conditions to do so is a responsibility to 
do so and to help create the conditions for more to do so.  This is a real pattern, we can 
encourage it.  
However, to reiterate, these patterns, isomorphic across scales and realms, define 
general parameters but do not determine absolutely.  Multi-realisability works 
ubiquitously; that things are multi-realisable supports these patterns being realised across 
scales and realms but also supports these realisations (actualisations) of the patterns 
themselves being multi.  That there are shared quasi-causal patterns does limit what is 
actualised.  Furthermore, that one pattern is being actualised at one moment does not 
preclude a shift to another pattern in a future moment.  The significance of this point for 
social ontology and ethics should be apparent. 
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 The move from one attractor to another can be within a type (one periodic to 
another) or from one type to another (steady to chaotic), they can go in any direction and 
lack perfect predictability due to infinite sensitivity to the infinitesimal at critical 
moments of transition.  These transitions are the previously mentioned bifurcations where 
natural or social reality unfolds in one way rather than another.  The next section will 
discuss them in more detail.   
 
Bifurcation 
 
Bottom-up approaches, like DeLanda’s approach to history in 1000yrs, along with 
the sciences that are integral to his view, show us that things are especially unpredictable 
at or around bifurcations.  A bifurcation is the threshold (space-time, situation, degree of 
intensity) when and where something shifts from one relatively stable state to another, 
from one pattern to another, away from their current attractor to another; it is like a phase 
transition, for example freezing, or the onset of turbulence.   
At all space-times, even highly controlled scientific experiments, there are factors 
not accounted for that lead to a novel and unexpected emergence.  Away from or 
nowhere near a bifurcation any number of things may be added or taken away without 
consequence, but, at or near a bifurcation, a small variation can catalyse a completely 
different emergence than given some other variation, or the same variation at a slightly 
different space-time.  For instance, someone having never encountered water would have 
no way of predicting that at certain temperature intensities H2O shifts between gas, solid, 
and liquid, especially given the range of temperatures that are, for most humans, of no 
obvious consequence to water, ice, and steam.  Having then encountered H2O and its 
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bifurcations within a range of temperature intensities they would be able to predict the 
occurrence and outcome of its bifurcations (as see it as the same thing exiting 
differently).  However, even in this relatively simple case the predictions can only have a 
degree of probability and accuracy since the exact conditions of and outcomes for these 
bifurcations are variable depending on, for instance, atmospheric pressure and dissolved 
substances in the water, but also the precision of the thermometer used.  The first two are 
material factors affecting the change of state, the thermometer though not an important 
material factor (though its presence would absorb or add a portion of the energy affecting 
the H2O) it is an important factor for the accuracy of human prediction.  None of these 
things noticeably matter with reference to the state of the water until near or at the 
bifurcation, when a small variation in any of the important parameters has a marked 
effect on the occurrence and outcome of the bifurcation.  This can be observed in the 
wide variety of precipitation that forms in Earth’s turbulent atmosphere.   
We can apply like reasoning to human history.  Think of the whole of humanity as 
a material, a fluid, something with intensity and that is affected by intensities.  As human 
population increases its own intensity increases, along with all the matter-energy-
information-thought flows associated with humans i.e., genes, memes, minerals, 
electricity, water, oil, biomass, money, and so on.  Who knows when a bifurcation might 
be crossed and what unanticipated possibilities for living might arise as a consequence.  
For instance—to speak in vary broad terms—an intensification of population density in 
Detroit followed by a sharp decrease, given innumerable other factors, including many 
fires, has ended up entailing an emerging population of urban farms and farmers.  There 
came a time when this may have been predicted by somebody, but not too long ago 
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nobody would have predicted it, it was not part of the plan. There was no plan.  
Intensities changed, bifurcations were crossed, different attractors became actualised, and 
so Detroit has urban farms and farmers.  Detroit, with its early mass deployment of the 
car, was also the birth place of the mall.  We did not invent cars to get to the mall, nor 
were they conceived together as part of a grand plan.  The point is to look at what really 
happened, what were the actual dynamics that led to the expansion of Detroit and then its 
loss of population.  Did people leave because of crime, because they were encouraged to 
by marketing, because they wanted to, because they could, because they were racist, 
because of a loss of jobs?  Why was there crime, why did marketing go the direction it 
did (and the answer is not simply money, we can look at actual studies and histories of 
actual marketing and formulate an amendable concrete answer), why did people want to, 
how were they able to, why and how racism (a relatively old and young question 
extensively answered, far from permanently solved), why less jobs, why ‘jobs’ at all?  
There is a multitude of factors at a multitude of scales.   
Because of our immediate spatio-temporal scale we spend most of our time 
between bifurcations, or within ones that proceed just slowly enough for us to easily not 
notice.  In an apparently stable world the deterministic laws of the current apparently 
static state of things tend to dominate.  However, as discussed, at or around a bifurcation 
subtle “fluctuations and random elements play an important role.”76 The same small thing 
that happened without consequence a million space-times before can now affects 
characteristics of the state of things post-bifurcation.  Some argue that this simply makes 
                                                 
76 Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers. Order out of Chaos: Man’s New Dialogue with 
Nature (Boulder and London: New Science Library, 1984), 176. 
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it a technical problem of accounting for all factors, but given that the closer to the 
bifurcation the smaller the fluctuation needs to be, it is a regress to the infinitely 
infinitesimal.  There will always be a scale smaller and bigger than we are able to 
perceive that will affect the outcome of bifurcations.  While this absence of perfect 
knowledge of initial conditions rules out perfect prediction and control, it grounds the 
possibility of exploration and experimentation across natural and social reality.  This 
possibility of novel experimentation has both an evolutionary significance for humanity 
(without experiment and change we will certainly die), but more importantly an ethical 
significance:  it enables us to live freely and together in the context of mutual recognition 
of new ideas for living.    
 However, as much as scale discloses unpredictability, entities at different scales 
are emergent and so have properties, capacities, and tendencies independent from their 
parts at other scales.  It is this reality that has allowed us, at a given range of scales, to 
predict certain things, to a degree, using the various methods and tools built up through 
history.  These methods and tools themselves are evolving spaces of possibility structured 
by attractors and bifurcations.  Attractors are the regularities that stabilise, temporarily, a 
given system.  The next section will discuss attractors in more detail. 
 
Attractors 
 
Mathematically, attractors are patterns or tendencies of a system as viewed ‘in’ 
phase space, the areas surrounding them, the area within which trajectories are drawn into 
its pattern, are called basins of attraction.  The scare quotes on ‘in’ are a reminder that 
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phase space is an abstract mathematical construct to experiment with interactions and 
rates of change, it is non-metric, its shapes are not shapes, its spaces not space, it is n-
dimensions of possibility, it is a realm of instantaneous values where the behavior of 
interacting components emerge as patterns and trajectories.  John Protevi does some work 
similar to DeLanda’s.  Protevi’s article, DGE, has been and will continue to be used as a 
means to further and alternatively define some of the aspects of the conception of reality 
and emergence being promoted by this thesis.  Protevi writes the following concerning 
attractors, basins of attraction, and bifurcations: 
... the areas of phase space surrounding attractors - representing normal behaviour of the system in 
one or another of its behaviour patterns - are called 'basins of attraction'. The behaviour patterns 
described by attractors are formed by the action of negative feedback mechanisms. The layout of 
attractors in the phase space, which describes the layout of the patterns of behaviour of the system, 
is defined by the layout of singularities, which are mathematical objects that define the topological 
structure of the manifold; a singularity is a point where the graph of the function changes direction 
… A singularity in the manifold indicates a bifurcator in the phase space model which in turn 
represents a threshold where the real system changes qualitatively … A singularity ... defines 
where attractors are found by indicating the limits of basins of attraction … In model terms, in 
zones of sensitivity or crisis situations we find fractal borders between basins of attraction, so that 
any move, no matter how small and in no matter what direction, might - or might not - trigger the 
move to another basin of attraction.  Here we have an irreducible element of 'chance' even though 
the system is thoroughly deterministic.77  
 
However, a point of clarification is necessary.  The singularities described above are 
equated with bifurcations, which is how the term is employed by mathematicians.  
Deleuze took this term and widened from a mathematical object in phase space to capture 
reality (the multi-realisable virtual, and the individual actual) because it indicates 
remarkable points of interest and importance (like bifurcations).  The “action of negative 
feedback mechanisms” in the above quotation is analogous to the feedback discussed 
earlier.  
                                                 
77 Protevi, DGE, 23. 
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Attractors function by drawing out a particular possibility virtual within a given 
material context to create an individual singularity.  The number of parameters and 
attractors defines the degree of complexity of any system.  A pendulum and a soap 
bubble are examples of single point or steady attractor phase spaces, coming to rest 
perpendicular to Earth and minimizing surface tension respectively.   A more complex 
example would be the attractors that are common to the formation of all solid 
precipitation, that which, though each snowflake is a uniquely singular embodiment of it, 
remains common to all.  Is it the water, the process of freezing or physical features of the 
speck of dust at its core that make each snow flake unique but identifiable?  The answer 
is all of the above, and infinitely more, in combination; the formation of a snow flake is 
an example of nonlinear causality.  It is the same component materials, the same process, 
the same diagram that is actualised each time, but each flake is a unique product.  What 
emerges from the combination of the components and the different intensities that drive 
the process is an individual singularity with properties, capacities, and tendencies 
different than those of its parts.  These emergent characteristics of the whole supersede 
those of the parts considered in abstraction.  
Let me flesh this point out by returning to the example of this thesis.  It as an 
actual thing actualises attractors (there are multiple and varied attractors given the 
complexity, that is, the number of things involved, and their number of degrees of 
freedom).  As for the writer, as part of the process of actualising a thesis, his development 
is being animated by, among other things, his complex attraction (in some ways steady, 
periodic, and chaotic) to actualising his ideas as a defensible thesis.  In the human 
intentional realm I equate goals and attractors.  This equation anticipates adding a 
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normative emergent telos and goal to nonlinear material reality.  At this point let me 
return to the example of the writer:  
In the final semester of his BA the goal of his ideas being expressed as a major 
paper propelled him to attend writing workshops, to go to student services, then the 
‘special needs’ department, which led to psychological testing which led to strategies and 
tools for completing essays (some of which were added to his existing process).  His 
writing has always suffered an inability to reconcile what he actually wrote with the ideal 
image he had of an academic essay.  Rather than just trying to say what he wanted to say 
using the materials available he struggled to make essays be like some vague notion of 
what an essay is supposed to be like.  The focus was the ideal form rather than the real 
content, not that a ‘form’ is not important, but that it should emerge from what is trying 
to be said—also not that this thesis has actualised in such a form.  Even when the essays 
were ‘complete’, i.e. handed in, he was alienated from them and the development that 
could have come from them was to a degree arrested; they could not be recognised as 
something with which he identified.   
Faced with a reified ideal that the real tends to be irreconcilable with, people tend 
to give up or sabotage themselves by, for example, misusing durations of time; they are 
left to wallow in the devalued real whose development, along with their own as part of it, 
has been arrested.  Had the goal of expressing his ideas in essay form not been there, and 
been strong enough, he would have given up out of frustration. 
Another example is when the ideal telos of an impossible to attain  body type 
leads people to devalue their real body and arrests the development of what it really 
(virtually and actually) might be.  In some cases not only arresting development but 
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turning to even more explicit self-destruction.  On the other hand the genuine (emergent, 
contingent) goal of health for a given body animates the development of what that body 
really might be.
 78
   
Though the writer’s development and that of the essay were arrested to a degree, 
because the goal of expressing his ideas in essay form inhibited him, he was still driven 
to keep trying, to keep developing.  How and why?  Along with natural and more 
removed situational factors, an important factor was the encouraging support of other 
humans and social wholes.  In other words, there was sufficient recognition of his value 
and the value of the project from others to sustain his efforts to the degree adequate for 
the project’s completion.  Equally he and the project were adequately recognisant of what 
needed to be to the degrees adequate to result in the completion of the project.  All of 
which could have proceeded any number of other ways, but proceeded the way it did and 
has resulted in these words; strange, interesting, and important given the creativity of 
reality. 
To sum up:  I argue that there is an ethically important equation between 
attractors and goals.  It is on this equation that I found the notion that DeLanda’s reality 
has room for emergent teloi and goals.  It is in the virtual realm of immanent patterns of 
becoming that one might find something like an emergent goal.  An emergent goal that, 
given that there are better and worse experiments, answers, happenings, lifestyles and 
thoughts, does not lead us to reified social and political structures that limit the 
actualisation of human capacities and contentment.  So while it is effectively infinitely 
                                                 
78 Much could be said about what is meant here by health or by health in general, a matter for 
another work. 
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open to difference, it is ethically not open to things that limit sustained human 
actualisation of physical, social, and mental capacities and contentment.  I submit mutual 
equal recognition as a universal singularity (immanent pattern) that is actualised by the 
emergences that are better for the largest number of humans over the largest duration.  A 
more detailed understanding of emergence would be beneficial if we are going to think 
about the emergence of goals within DeLanda’s reality populated by equally real 
emergent assemblages.  To recap some of what has been said about what it is to be an 
emergent assemblage.  To be emergent entails having properties, capacities, and 
tendencies, not present in ones components, and so entails not be reducible to those parts.  
It entails there being no fundamental parts and no fundamental wholes, everything is 
equally a whole-part, considering something a part or a whole is relative to the scales 
being considered.  The concept assemblage captures being a historical, emergent, whole-
part, which equally entails being dependent on the interaction process of parts, which 
entails being open and changeable.  Being open and change-able means that parts can 
come and go, assemblages can exchange parts, parts can birth new assemblages.  All 
things, from rocks to thoughts, are equally but differently assemblages that emerge from 
and catalyse creative complexity driven by difference.   
Emergent properties are what allow us to comprehend the development of 
qualitative differences within an exhaustive conception of the real as material.  All things 
which are are assemblages of material elements, but they are not all reducible to the parts 
from which they develop.  We need concepts appropriate to the qualitatively distinct 
assemblages that emerge:  chemical, biological, social, ethical.   The next chapter will 
examine the crucial concept of emergent properties in more detail, comparing DeLanda’s 
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understanding with those of other important thinkers in the field.   These other 
approaches will both supplement DeLanda, but also illustrate the greater overall 
explanatory power of his approach for the purposes of this thesis.  This chapter on 
emergent properties will also serve as the hinge that takes us from the problem of 
ontology generally to the problem of social order and individual experimentation with 
which the thesis will conclude.    
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CHAPTER III 
 
EMERGENCE 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As mentioned above, it is through emergence that the conceptual link is drawn 
between DeLanda’s neo-realist ontology and Russon’s ethics of recognition.  For both 
thinkers emergence is part of a contingent reality pregnant with possibility.  I will 
highlight the features of DeLanda’s account of emergence that makes it particularly 
appropriate for my project by contrasting it with Michael Silberstein and John 
McGeever’s, Robert Korn’s, John Protevi’s, and Margret Archer’s ‘emergentist’ thought.  
Archer’s work will be used to complete the bridge implied but not developed in 
DeLanda’s thought between general ontology human society, agency, and ethical 
principles. 
 
DeLanda: Properties, Capacities, and Tendencies 
 
For DeLanda, the identities of concrete emergent wholes, those whose existence 
can be known, are defined by their emergent properties, capacities and tendencies.
79
 
These concrete emergent wholes are sustained by the interaction of wholes at other scales 
(the parts of a given whole), wholes with their own properties, capacities, and tendencies 
that emerge from the interaction of other wholes (their parts).   For example, as I 
                                                 
79 DeLanda, Philosophy & Simulation, 3. 
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discussed in the previous chapter, a species as much as an organism has a birthday (event 
of speciation) and potential death (event of extinction).  DeLanda writes: “The human 
species exists ‘alongside’ the human organisms that compose it ... in an ontological plane 
populated only by historically individuated entities”.80  In addition to differing in scale, 
“the historically contingent identities of ... [individual entities are] defined by their 
emergent properties, capacities, and tendencies”.81 Properties, capacities, and tendencies 
are all emergent aspects of emergent individuals.  I will use the example of a that 
DeLanda employs in the introduction to Philosophy & Simulation, to further explain 
these key points.   
Properties of a whole are always actual.  In the case of a knife the emergent 
property of sharpness (a triangular cross section which emerges from the interaction of 
metallic atoms in a particular way, a way whose process of emergence and maintenance 
includes humans) is always actual for a knife.  Capacities of a whole may go un-
actualised; the capacity of a knife to cut may never be actualised.  Further, when a 
capacity is actualised it is not as a state, but as an event.  In the case of the knife, the 
relevant event is cutting.  Also, the event of a capacity being actualised “is always 
double: [in the case of a knife] to cut-to be cut.” Something’s capacity being actualised 
requires the existence of a situation that enables the exercise of that capacity.  A knife 
needs cuttable things to exercise its capacity to cut.  “Thus, while properties can be 
specified without reference to anything beyond themselves, capacities to affect must 
                                                 
80 DeLanda, DHS, 5-6 
81 DeLanda, Philosophy & Simulation, 3.  
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always be thought in relation to capacities to be affected.”82 It is worth noting that 
capacities can be relative to scale.   Something that cannot be cut at one scale can be cut 
at another.  For example, at the scale common to humans a knife has the capacity to cut 
flesh, while at the molecular scale a human scale knife might compress something, more 
likely just displace, but most likely do nothing at all.  A knife can cut organs and 
organisms but not individual molecules.     
While properties and capacities are distinct from each other, DeLanda also 
describes a complex symmetry between them.  On the one hand, capacities depend on 
properties—to cut and to be cut depends on the property of sharpness.  On the other hand, 
sharpness emerges from metallic atoms exercising their capacities to interact in certain 
ways and, to anticipate, manifesting their tendency toward solidity within certain 
intensive ranges.  In other words, the relation of properties and capacities is relative to 
scale.  At one scale, capacities depend on properties.  However, when we view reality at 
multiple scales we see that the properties at one scale depend on the capacities of the 
parts at scales below.
83
  A friend network and its properties depends on its members 
capacities, for example, to communicate and remember.     
As for tendencies, these are things that manifest themselves relative to different 
intensities.  For instance, the metal of a knife has the emergent property of solidity but at 
certain intensities of temperature it manifests its tendency to liquefy and at even greater 
intensities, to gasefy.  At a certain intensity of conflict a given friend network will 
                                                 
82 Philosophy & Simulation, 3-4 
83 DeLanda, Philosophy & Simulation, 4 
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manifest a tendency to break apart.  At a certain lack of intensity of contact between its 
members a tendency to dissolve.    
Tendencies and capacities are ontologically similar insofar as they are both real 
but can go unactualised.  When they are actualised, they are actualised as events.  The 
main difference is that tendencies are typically finite while capacities are not because of 
their correlation with the capacities to be affected of countless other things.
84
  “Capacities 
involve a much larger set of possibilities than tendencies because entities can exercise 
their capacities in interaction with a potentially innumerable variety of other entities.”85  
The more complex an entity is, the greater the number of tendencies it has.  For example, 
a human friend network has a much greater variety of possible tendencies than a 
sharpened piece of metal.  Recall that more complexity is the same thing as more highly 
organised.  A fluid body of mixed temperatures is more complex, than one of uniform 
temperature, insofar as there are the patterns that emerge from the interaction of the 
different temperature intensities.  By the same description the mixed body is more highly 
organised insofar as there is coherent organised movement of its constituent parts.  This 
is a way of conceptualising how more complexity is not merely a quantitative but also 
and importantly qualitative.  A shift to more complexity, like the shift from atom to 
molecule, to human, is by some measures a quantitative shift up in the degree of 
complexity and organisation from the parts which precede, but it is also a qualitative shift 
in complexity and organisation and importantly in the creative freedom that can be 
                                                 
84 DeLanda, Philosophy & Simulation, 4-5. 
85 DeLanda, Philosophy & Simulation, 20. 
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enabled in dealing with the situations of life at these scales of greater creative complexity 
driven by difference.      
Before moving forward, let me reiterate some key elements of the idea of 
emergence.  Emergent properties are animated by the interaction of differences.  
Emergent wholes are objectively irreducible to their constituent parts.  Finally, they are 
not closed totalities but individual entities capable of novel activity. Especially significant 
are those emergent properties associated with life.  As DeLanda argues “... it is hard to 
see how we could specify mechanisms of emergence for life or mind in general, as 
opposed to accounting for the emergent properties and capacities of concrete wholes like 
a metabolic circuit, an assembly of neurons,”86 or the 2012 philosophy department at the 
University of Windsor.  
The next section will continue the process of detailing DeLanda’s conception of 
emergence and supporting its use for this thesis.  Specifically, the distinction Silberstein 
and McGeever make between epistemological and ontological emergence will be 
discussed in relation to my reading of DeLanda. 
 
Silberstein and McGeever
87
 
 
I begin with a quotation from Silberstein & McGeever:   
... [We] distinguish epistemological emergence, where emergence is merely an artefact of a 
particular model or formalism generated by macroscopic analysis, functional description or some 
other kind of 'higher-level' description or explanation, from cases that potentially involve 
ontological emergence. By this we mean features of systems or wholes that possess causal 
capacities not reducible to any of the intrinsic causal capacities of the parts nor to any of the 
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(reducible) relations between the parts. Emergent properties are properties of a system taken as a 
whole which exert a causal influence on the parts of the system consistent with, but distinct from, 
the causal capacities of the parts themselves. Ontological emergence therefore entails the failure of 
part—whole reductionism.... Part—whole reductionism says that all wholes are completely 
reducible to their most basic parts (entities without parts). There are two ways of cashing this. The 
first, as in Scharf, is as follows: “a whole is explained by being shown to be nothing but the parts, 
inter-related in a certain manner ... micro-reduction requires that compound elements (objects 
composed of parts) and their properties be explainable in terms of their parts and their inter-
relations”.88 Kim89, on the other hand, puts the point thus: “wholes are completely determined, 
causally and ontologically, by their parts”.90   
 
We have here two more thinkers opposed to reductionism, but more than that we 
have a distinction not explicitly present in DeLanda, that between epistemological and 
ontological emergence.  The value of their work is that they give us the term—
ontological emergence—that we need to fully understand DeLanda’s position, for it is 
clear that ontological emergence is what DeLanda is talking about.  He would agree that 
“ontological emergence (the failure of part-whole reductionism) is the most interesting 
and important kind of emergence.”91  They also agree that emergence not only blocks 
philosophical essentialism and sociological micro-reductionism, but from science, “the 
very idea that the stuff at the bottom (whether it be fundamental laws or fundamental 
entities) provides the ultimate explanation for all phenomena.”92     
However, Silberstein & McGeever do have a problem with disciplines that look to 
“dynamical systems theory, with its characterisation of nonlinear systems ... [to] provide 
                                                 
88 A. Scharf, “Quantum Measurement and the Program for Unity of Science”, Philosophy of 
Science, 60 (1989), pp. 601-23, at p. 602.  Here cited in Silberstein & McGeever, SOE, 182 n. 1.    
89 J. Kim, “Supervenience and Nomological Incommensurables,” American Philosophical 
Quarterly, 15 (1978), pp. 149-56, at p. 154.  Here cited in Silberstein & McGeever, SOE, 182 n. 2.  
90 Silberstein & McGeever, SOE, 182-83.   
91 Silberstein & McGeever, SOE, 183. 
92 Silberstein & McGeever, SOE, 183. 
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support for the existence of some sort of emergence.”93 This approach is the one 
DeLanda takes.  Silberstein & McGeever’s critique amounts to the claim that the users of 
nonlinear dynamics tend towards epistemological emergence.  Referring to cases where a 
theorist simply points to nonlinear complexity and claims emergence i.e. that it only 
appears emergent because we cannot otherwise explain it, yet.
94
    
 Below is a graphic summary of what Silberstein takes to be the main versions of 
ontological and epistemological emergence. 
                                             
 
             Relata of emergence
95
 
                                                  
              Real world items                    Representational items 
        ONT-emergence between   EPIST-emergence between 
 Parts/wholes  Concepts 
 Properties  Theories 
 Events/processes  Models 
 Causal capacities  Frameworks 
 Laws  Laws 
 Entities …  States of a dynamical system… 
 
                                                 
93 Silberstein & McGeever, SOE, 184-85. 
94 Protevi, DGE, 27. 
95 Michael Silberstein, “Reduction, Emergence and Explanation,” in The Blackwell Guide to the 
Philosophy of Science, eds. Peter Machamer and Michael Silberstein eds. 80-107 (Malden, Mass. USA: 
Blackwell Publishers 2002) 90. 
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The distinction between these two types of emergence, for the purposes of this thesis, is 
fairly straight forward.  However, for the purposes of explicit philosophy of science a 
more fine grained analysis would be appropriate.
96
 
To reiterate, in general terms, something is epistemologically emergent when it is 
considered emergent merely because we do not know how to explain it.  “Emergentists 
will propose level-specific laws, while reductionists will claim them to be merely 
'epistemological emergence' or simply markers of our (temporary) ignorance.”97  In more 
detail, Silberstein & McGeever argue in relation to this distinction that  
The first problem is whether any specific claim is merely an epistemological one regarding the 
ineliminable nature (emergence) of some 'higher-level' description or explanation, or whether it is 
a robust ontological claim about the emergence of some novel feature of reality. If the former, then 
we should ask why the higher-level description or explanation is ineliminable. ... what exactly is 
being alleged to emerge from what? For example, is it properties, property instances, entities, new 
laws or dynamics that are being alleged to emerge? We must also ask how the emergence of the 
new feature is alleged to occur, and what relations it bears to that from which it emerged.98   
 
Answering these questions (and others) is analogous to what DeLanda undertakes in all 
his analyses of entities and processes.   
However, their argument might also be read as specifically challenging something 
like DeLanda’s conception of the virtual and what populates it.  He most explicitly and 
succinctly makes his case for the reality of the virtual as emergent and being populated 
by real emergences in the first two chapters of Philosophy & Simulation, and the most 
detailed presentation is in ISVP.  Recall from the previous chapter that the virtual and its 
inhabitants came to be with and evolve through the interaction of actual things, and it can 
                                                 
96  See also, Silberstein & McGeever, SOE, and Silberstein, “Reduction Emergence and 
Explanation” in The Blackwell Guide. 
97 Protevi, DGE, 27. 
98 Silberstein & McGeever, SOE, 185. 
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be actually represented mathematically and computationally.  Recall also that it can be 
thought about as the realm of problems for which actualities are solutions.  When the 
interactions that sustain a given virtuality cease, it dies.  For instance, the virtual problem 
of a body trying to maintain itself afloat in water, for which there are effectively infinite 
solutions, would not be real if there were no bodies and no water.  So virtualities are 
ontologically real emergent properties of actual systems, because they are the ground of 
possibility of what actual systems can do:  
Do [virtual entities] exist, for example, as transcendent entities in a world beyond that of matter 
and energy? Or are they immanent to the material world? If all the matter and energy of the 
universe ceased to exist, would [virtual entities] also disappear (immanent) or would they continue 
to exist (transcendent)?  
If [virtual entities] are immanent they must be both irreducible to any particular material 
process while at the same time requiring that some process or another actually exists.  This implies 
that topological facts about possibility spaces can be discovered without reference to the nature of 
the degrees of freedom, only to their number, and without reference to the nature of the gradient 
(thermal, gravitational, mechanical, chemical) only to its existence. But the fact that the existence 
of a gradient, any gradient, is necessary confirms the immanent status of [virtual entities].  [Virtual 
entities] are, therefore, perfectly acceptable entities in a materialist philosophy.99     
 
Thus, the superior value of DeLanda’s understanding of reality as including 
virtuality is that it gives us a more inclusive conception of ontological emergence than in 
Silberstein & McGeever.  Cases of ‘epistemological’ emergence, perhaps most common 
for us at our scale, remain themselves cases of emergences from interactions animated by 
gradients in various ways at various scales and automatically entail the emergence of new 
virtual problems.  Moreover, at least through the actions of humans these emergences 
will in some way have a material, intensive, and so again actual manifestation in the 
world.  I argue that for DeLanda, as manifest in his commitment to a flat ontology, all 
emergence is ‘ontological’ or that the distinction between epistemological and 
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ontological emergence does not matter.  In the end, Silberstein & McGeever appear to be 
in agreement.    
It is possible that, in such a radically relational [interactive] world, the standard divisions and 
hierarchies between phenomena that are considered fundamental and emergent, aggregate and 
simple, kinematic and dynamic, and perhaps even between what is considered physical, biological 
and mental, are redrawn and redefined [a la Deleuze/DeLanda]. These divisions will be dependent 
on what question is being put to nature and what scale of phenomena is being probed. Again in 
such a world there will be no discrete hierarchy of causally closed levels. Ontological emergence 
means monism without reductionism.  
The obvious move for physicalists to make in response to all this is to try to screen off 
any ontological emergence from the macroscopic world. ... First, ontological emergence within 
quantum mechanics makes it plausible that it exists elsewhere, even if it is not quantum 
mechanical in nature. Second, either everything is reducible to fundamental physics or it is not. If 
it is reducible, if everything is quantum mechanical, then ontological emergence is ubiquitous ... 
If, on the other hand, the macroscopic is not reducible to the microscopic ... then the entire world 
of classical objects is somehow ontologically emergent. In short, ontological emergence is most 
probably a real feature of the world.100 
 
Again I promote DeLanda because of his thoroughgoing inclusivity.  The next section 
will discuss Korn’s conception of emergence and his view of causal hierarchies, showing 
how he too is not inclusive enough, a conclusion which further supports my choice to use 
DeLanda as the ontological basis of the arguments of this thesis. 
 
Korn 
 
In “The Emergence Principle in Biological Hierarchies” Korn is attempting to 
rehabilitate the concept of hierarchy within biology.  His motivations for doing this are 
not explicit, though some are indicated and will be so in this section i.e. that things lower 
on the hierarchy are ‘freer’, from which normative/social implication could be drawn.  To 
begin, a quotation from Korn about his conception of hierarchy and its relation to 
emergence:  
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I have developed a ... concept of a hierarchy that can be used to inspect the phenomenon of 
emergence ... A hierarchy is held together by descending constraints and new features can arise 
when an upper level entity restrains its components in new combinations that are not expected 
when viewing the components...101   
 
Here Korn’s conception of hierarchy, as will be seen, are analogous to Archer’s 
conception of stratification (which is similar to scale as it has been presented).  Korn’s 
hierarchies are stratified (scaled) emergent wholes.  While he says they are more than the 
sum of their parts, there is also the indication of a commitment to downward causation.  
He holds that wholes are different from their parts but tweaks it as follows:  
Components of a hierarchy, however, are constrained and have less freedom of activity than they 
did before they entered the hierarchy, leading to the conclusion that the whole is much less than 
the sum of its parts when the parts are considered in an unconstrained context.102 
 
Korn explains why this qualification concerning ‘freedom’ is important:  
A pendulum clock tells time which none of its parts can even begin to do because the parts are 
fashioned and arranged in a specific manner so that the constraints make the whole function 
coordinately as a clock. The parts, however, can be refashioned and rearranged into a toy crane, a 
dentist's drill or a primitive analog computer.103 
 
We see that Korn is referring to the virtual capacities of the parts, but he (as the 
reductionist he is) is prioritising the lower levels of the hierarchies he seems to impose as 
necessary.  However, as we have seen entities at each scale are ontologically equal, they 
each have an equally effectively infinite list of virtual capacities.  Parts as ‘constrained’ 
within wholes, thanks to relations of exteriority, maintain their capacities and in a sense 
gain those of the whole they are interacting to sustain.  New spaces of possibility are 
opened to parts by being part of a whole.  While some of their capacities are blocked 
(constrained) by coming together as a whole, these capacities are not lost, and others are 
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gained.  When a human body assembles with a bicycle certain capacities, like walking or 
crawling are not available to be actualised, but they are not lost and a whole new range 
are opened by being part of this assemblage.  It is about the quality as well as the quantity 
of freedom.  An atom may have a great amount of freedom as an atom, it could be part of 
a planet, a human, or a star, but what can and does it actually do as an individual atom?  
What can and does it actually do as part of a molecule? Things it cannot do as an 
atomised atom.  An atom floating in a void may have all of its infinite possibilities, but 
that is all it has, it does not and cannot do anything.  A human would be less free, have 
less opportunity to learn and develop without the hierarchies and meshworks that we are 
part of (‘constrained’ by).  This is not to deny that there are assemblages that reduce the 
freedom of their parts, it is to reserve the concept for human situations that do constrain 
human freedom to actualise capacities.    
Korn ends up reifying scales and preferring the lower to the higher.  He accepts 
emergence but wants to make simpler things more free.  He describes inverted 
hierarchies, where the most ‘free’ elements are on the bottom and as we move up to 
emergent scales, where things can do things their parts cannot, the distinguishing feature 
is not the novel properties, capacities and tendencies (novel freedoms), but how wholes 
constrain their parts.  This approach is the opposite of the one DeLanda adopts.  For 
DeLanda, parameters or degrees of freedom or constraints are important but they are not 
primary or fundamental.  They are equally part of a reality of creative complexity driven 
by difference, and it is the way that constraint produces novelty and creative solutions 
that are fundamental to the ethical concerns of my argument.  For example, being part of 
social justice movements ‘constrained’ (changed) what one could and did do, but also 
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enabled women to vote (it changed the mixture of the infinite calculus of how things are 
constrained and enabled).  In a broad sense constraint is ubiquitous insofar as interaction 
parameterised by emergent properties, capacities, and tendencies is ubiquitous (the same 
for enablement).  That anything is free to do anything at all entails interaction, 
enablement and constraint.  Moreover, speaking to constraint in a narrower sense similar 
to Korn’s, we will see in the next section that there is emergence that does not involve 
constraint but the emergence of novelty within a given set of parameters that expands, at 
least alters, those parameters.  The next section will briefly look at three types of 
emergence distinguished by Protevi.   
 
Protevi 
 
Protevi distinguishes diachronic, synchronic and transverse emergence.   These 
three terms help conceptualise the wider view of emergence being promoted by this 
thesis.  In general terms, diachronic is the emergence of novelty, synchronic is the 
emergence of order (which can of course be novel), and transverse is the emergence of 
assemblages that have biological, social and/or technical components.  Protevi also calls 
transverse emergence and its observation/analysis/simulation ‘political physiology’.104 
Synchronic emergence, according to Protevi is 
... definition: a synchronically emergent structure is that which enables focused systematic 
behaviour through constraining the action of component parts. This definition encapsulates what 
Thompson and Varela 2001105 call 'reciprocal causality': the mutual constitution of local-to-global 
                                                 
104 Protevi, DGE, 20. 
105 Thompson, Evan, and Francisco Varela (2001). “Radical Embodiment: Neuronal Dynamics 
and Consciousness,” Trends in Cognitive Science 5: 418-425.  
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or 'upward' causality that produces focused systematic behaviour and the global-to-local or 
'downward' causality that constrains the local interactions of components. Synchronic emergence 
is the emergence of 'order out of chaos' as the popular formula has it.106  
 
Protevi notes that this type of emergence has unfortunately dominated much of the 
discussion of emergence.  It is this focus that allowed Korn to reduce all emergence to 
scaled hierarchies distinguished by downward constraint.  It has also supported other 
reductionism in the social sciences, such as structure to agency or vice versa, or “the 
issues of physicalism, eliminative materialism, reductionism, supervenience, and so 
forth” in philosophy of mind.107 
However, there is also “diachronic emergence … [which] is the creation of new 
patterns and thresholds in a system.”108 Diachronic emergence explains how wholes can 
maintain their identity even though their parts change.  For example, while new players 
for the Toronto Blue Jays are always emerging and receding, the team itself remains.109 
This position helps to explain what has been said about emergent wholes not being closed 
totalities.   
The final form of emergence according to Protevi is transverse emergence.  This 
form comes in four varieties.
110
 What are important are not the details of each form, but 
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107 Protevi, DGE, 27. 
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  1. Homeostratic synchronic transversal emergence:  
a. organic (symbiosis among organisms; ecosystems among groups of 
organisms)  
b. social (institutions forming a larger entity: colleges forming a university)  
c. technical (e.g., computers and routers forming the Internet).   
 
2. Homeostratic diachronic transversal emergence:  
a. organic (symbiogenesis: Margulis' theory of the origin of the eukaryotic cell)  
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the general explanatory power of transverse emergence.  It captures nuanced forms of 
emergence important to the thesis.  1. Emergence of things from the interaction of parts 
that are necessary for the thing to be what it is e.g. a colony emerging from ants.  2. 
Emergence of something from something else or what Protevi calls ‘system change’ e.g. 
the change of American democratic politics from something exclusively for white males 
to something ostensibly for any registered citizen.  3. Emergence of things from the 
interaction of social, biological, and technical parts, this form would seem to broadly 
capture most of the human world, for instance, all that has emerged from the assemblage 
of human-horse-saddle, or human-symbols-media being assembled with various social 
wholes.  4. The emergence of novel virtual problems.  These nuanced forms of 
emergence are of interest insofar as they are the types of emergence most important to 
explain how the ethical can develop out of the natural and the social.  The ethical 
emerges as a distinct region of experimental solutions to the problems of social life, 
which in turn develop out of the problems posed for human being by its situation in 
nature.  
 What is important is that our freedom and our unity is difference.  In every 
encounter there is the problem of maintaining identity in the face of a challenge to it.  
                                                                                                                                                 
b. social (system change: change of the university from education of elite into a 
centre for mass vocational training / military-industrial research)  
c. technical (system change: from ARPANET to Internet to world wide web)  
 
3. Heterostratic synchronic transversal emergence: (a bio-social-technical assemblage)  
 
4. Heterostratic diachronic transversal emergence: (mutation and co-evolution of such                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
assemblages in 'machinic phyla'). (Protevi, DGE, 32) 
 
“'machinic phyla’ ... [are] groups of assemblages defined by their affects: what they can do and 
what they can undergo.” (Protevi, DGE, 32)  In DeLandian terms, groups defined by their 
capacities. 
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Stable solutions are those that depend upon the maintenance of dynamic tensions between 
the different elements of the encounter.  An ethically legitimate solution depends not only 
on stability, but on the genuine recognition of the value of the different approaches to 
living that different people create as emergent solutions to the problems social and 
natural context impose upon us.  However, in order to fully grasp the ethical significance 
of these ontological matters, we must turn our attention explicitly to the social realm.  
The work of Margaret Archer –while not unproblematic, as we will see, establishes the 
bridge between natural and social emergences that the argument needs to establish its 
ethical conclusions. 
 
Archer 
 
In what follows I will not present a comprehensive analysis of Archer, as her 
work is not the subject of the thesis.  I am using quotations from Being Human to 
establish a connection between the general ontological theory of DeLanda and the social 
theory and ethics of Russon.
 111
  While Archer is highly valuable in this regard, it is also 
the case that her understanding of emergence suffers in some regards in relation to 
DeLanda.  Thus, while I am using Archer’s work, I am not using it uncritically.   
Archer and DeLanda are in agreement concerning some of the problems facing 
social theory.  They both highlight the dangers of micro and macro reductionism, 
although she uses the terms ‘upward’ and ‘downward’ conflation, or ‘Modernity’s Man’ 
and ‘Society’s Being.’  Contra either form of reductionism, both she and DeLanda 
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essentially argue that parts and wholes mutually interact in feedback loops within and 
across scales.  But whereas DeLanda does not draw any essential distinction between 
natural and social wholes, Archer concentrates on emergent properties peculiar to society:  
In contradistinction to both 'Society's Being' and 'Modernity's Man', social realism introduces a 
stratified view of 'the subject' whose different properties and powers (PEPs [personal emergent 
properties]) emerge at each level. To anticipate, the four strata involved are the self, the person, 
the agent and the actor. The latter two are undoubtedly our 'social selves' which emerge 
respectively through our involuntary embroilment in society's distribution of resources and our 
voluntary involvement in society's role-array. However, they are themselves dependent upon the 
prior emergence of a continuous sense of self and are co-dependent with the emergence of 
personal identity, which reflectively balances its social concerns with those embedded in the 
natural and practical orders of reality.112  
  
Archer thus provides the specific conceptual grounds I need to establish the ethical 
conclusions that interest me.  DeLanda demonstrates that nature is itself dynamic and 
creative, Archer demonstrates the ways in which society enables the emergence of the 
specifically human capacities for intentional action and creativity.  Thus, while both 
DeLanda and Archer support the idea that reality is scaled, Archer develops concepts 
specific to the relevant scales of human social life: institutions, individual wholes, minds. 
Like DeLanda, she uses a scaled reality to counter both macro and micro reductionist 
claims.  She concentrates upon the emergent properties (selves, consciousness, etc.,) that 
explain how human beings—composed of natural elements—are nevertheless capable of 
creating value and meaning in their lives.  These capacities are unique properties and 
powers (analogous to capacities and tendencies) of human beings that bridge the distance 
between unconscious natural creative process and intentionally creative human action.   
         That which she argues with regard to the social is not incompatible with DeLanda’s 
more general ontology.  We can see the similarity between them in her attempt to 
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privilege neither the micro (biology) nor macro (society) scales when understanding 
individual human capacities: 
The properties and powers of the human being are neither seen as pregiven, nor as socially 
appropriated, but rather these are emergent from our relations with our environment. As such, they 
have relative autonomy from biology and society alike, and causal powers to modify both of them. 
In fact, the stratified view of humanity advocated here sees human beings as constituted by a 
variety of strata. Each stratum is emergent from, but irreducible to, lower levels because all strata 
possess their own sui generis properties and powers.113 
 
As we can see, she argues the reduction is impossible because all levels of reality have 
emergent properties peculiar to themselves.  That which is crucial for Archer is mapping 
the proper concepts onto the proper scale—natural concepts to natural reality, social to 
social realities, and so on: 
At any moment the CS [(Cultural System)] is the product of historical Socio-Cultural interaction, 
but having emerged (emergence being a continuous process) then qua product, it has properties of 
its own which influence discursive relations with S-C [(socio-cultural)] actors. In other words, 
there are causal influences exerted by the CS on the S-C level.114   
 
So individual activity is not absolutely free, but constrained, but not absolutely 
determined, either.  Human beings can respond creatively within the given natural and 
social contexts in which they find themselves.  This possibility of creative response, we 
will see, is crucial to the possibility of an ethics of experimentation.  Thus, the value of 
Archer is that she enables the argument to bridge the divide between unintentional natural 
systems and intentional human action. 
At the same time, there is also a danger in the way Archer explains the 
relationship between these layers of strata.  It could be the case that her generalised 
categories, the CS and the S-C, become reified.  General categories, like essences, may 
describe things, but they do not explain them, since they do not actually exist.  At 
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minimum, reified general categories do not adapt to the ever-changing reality they intend 
to describe.  All that describes and explains reality is reality, and so for us observation, 
analysis, simulation, and experimentation with real populations of real things and the 
immanent patterns of development they can isomorphically share.  Reified general 
categories dictate (top-down) the program of study, missing the process animated by 
difference.   They do not let the real tell its story.  
While DeLanda’s general ontology lacks specifically social categories—which is 
why we need to examine Archer’s work—it remains essential to the overall project 
because of its concrete specificity and avoidance of attributing causal powers to general 
categories.  We cannot speak of ‘society’ or ‘culture’ or any terminological combination 
of the two as real independent things.  We can speak of actually existing social entities, 
like a specific community, group, or state, study its history looking for the actual things 
that interacted and how they interacted to catalyze and sustain its emergence.  From the 
study of these real processes we can diagram mechanisms of emergence that will help us 
understand populations of entities, but only insofar as that population remains relatively 
stable, until inevitable bifurcation.   
These mechanisms may apply to populations of different things at different scales.  
There are trans-scale and trans-population mechanisms (there is isomorphism and multi-
realisability), however, there are things unique to each population at each scale and so 
unique patterns.
 115
  The previous patterns are there but there are new ones added to the 
mix.  There are also the differences in how given pattern actualises within nonorganic, 
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organic, biological, and social materials.  The important thing demonstrated by the 
observation of real populations, real mathematical models of populations, and real 
simulations of populations, as well as studies (including simulations) of human agency (a 
property and power of humans as part of populations) is that there is robust isomorphism 
between certain patterns generated by the interacting materials of all realms.  In very 
general terms, isomorphism is resemblance with respect to important (singular, 
significant, relevant) degrees of freedom, animating gradients, attractors, and 
bifurcations.   
Archer sometimes seems to lose sight of the importance of interaction of all 
elements and runs the risk of privileging a ‘continuous sense of self’ in her theory.  
Consider the following: “Introspectively, we are all constantly aware of the main 
property upon which this emergent process depends.”116  Regardless of the specific 
emergent process the idea that there is a main property on which it depends is 
problematic even if the study of the process is confined to one scale (recall bifurcations, 
as events of emergence).  In this case Archer is referring to the emergence of personal 
identity.  And the ‘main’ property on which this process depends is “that we live a rich 
inner life: that we are in continuous communion with ourselves and that we engage in a 
continual running commentary with the events going on around us.”117 This is perhaps 
saying something she does not intend to say.   
It can be argued that it is because humans are social that they have the capacity 
for ‘inner life,’ and also that we are able to be social because we have an inner life.  I 
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contend it just is not important to give primacy to one or the other and there are definite 
consequences to doing so.  Giving primacy to one or the other, at least seems to leave the 
door to reductionism and reification open. 
Archer is fundamentally trying to give humans and social wholes their due 
independence from each other, without denying their mutual dependence.  Her goal is 
clear from claims such as: “independent properties and powers have to be granted to both 
'structures' and to 'agents'.”118 In the case under consideration, however,  if ‘inner life’ is 
the ‘main’ human property that the emergence of personal identity depends on, then 
effectively everything that humans with personal identities are part of (everything that 
emerges from the interaction of personal identities) depends on this property of personal 
inner life, not on the capacity to interact.  Do we interact with each other because we 
have an inner life or have an inner life because we interact with each other (because we 
are here to interact with each other and do)?  Neither needs to be made primary, unless 
one wants to introduce a reified ontological hierarchy, which Archer may want to: PEP’s, 
CEP’s, and SEP’s.  If anything is primary it is interaction and all that entails, but not 
‘primary’, interaction is just the way of things insofar as things are different and in 
contact. 
Archer perhaps does not extend her conception of emergence far enough.  One 
can grant that even the structures and patterns, the scales, the most general conditions of 
being human we can observe are as historical and contingent as individual humans.  At 
times, for instance speaking of “The structures into which we are born”119, she is arguably 
                                                 
118 Archer, Being Human, 255. 
119 Archer, Being Human, 262. 
83 
 
83 
 
talking about something significantly similar the throwness Heidegger and others did.  
But one can understand that even this experience, so fundamental to ‘being human’, can 
be recognised as just as historically contingent as everything else.  But what is gained by 
this recognition?  Openness to the possibility of transcending ‘being human’ as it has 
contingently developed to be; it opens us to the possibility and value of experiment.  It is 
a stretch, given the effective reality of what Heidegger et al describe, but life may one 
day come into, be introduced to, conscious of, and live reality unimaginably differently.    
Some of the above critiques are merely semantic, directed at a certain 
inconsistency in her use of language which makes it appear that contingency is being 
subordinated to an overarching necessity.   Nevertheless, the language is important if one 
wants to promote a realist point of view that does justice to the complexity and creativity 
of all scales and realms of reality.  It is important to speak of real dynamics of real social 
entities, not generalised categories like CS and S-C that are imposed as the structure of 
necessary scales.  While Archer may be talking about a pattern that really exists she 
might be careful not to imply that scales themselves are any less historical and 
contingent.  Scales themselves are not real, populations of entities and processes are real 
and can be differentiated by scale.  
In elaborating a description of the dynamics of social reality that seems to lack a 
commitment to real concrete entities and processes (real populations of variable 
replicators being sorted by their situation, animated by differences, within a space of 
possibilities) Archer offers us a description that could, however currently apt, become 
obsolete or worse.  DeLanda gives us descriptions, but more importantly a point of view 
that is inherently adaptive and that produces inherently adaptive results by strictly 
84 
 
84 
 
observing the dynamics of real things (which includes computer simulations and 
mathematical models), always keeping contingency, bifurcation, multi-realisability and 
isomorphism in mind.  When supplemented by Archer’s social categories, it provides the 
needed ontological foundation for an ethics of experimentation.   
Despite these criticisms, then, Archer’s Being Human supplies the understanding 
of human social reality that links the general ontology of emergence and creative 
complexity driven by difference to human intentional activity, and thus to the possibility 
of an ethics of experimentation.  By making her social ontology isomorphic with general 
ontology of complexity, and by that model human agency emergent from being social, 
she grounds the ethical action of human agents in the maintenance of the conditions of 
their agency.  The ethical action of human agents is grounded in the life-requirements of 
their lives as social agents, in maintaining their social-life-requirements.  What having a 
general ontology of creative complexity driven by difference in the picture adds is the 
recognition that our social life and it requirements emerge from and interact with our 
physical life requirements, which emerge from the physical requirements of life as we 
know it, which emerge from our physical environment.  The inclusion of such an 
ontology provides a detailed and concrete way of looking things at all scales, in their 
dependence and their independence, grounding them in reality.  It does not reduce life to 
matter but raise matter to life, with the aim of expanding our ethics from ourselves and 
our groups to equally include all that sustains us as that we emerge from and interact 
with.  In other words, it allows us to ground our ethics in material reality, of which the 
social realm is an important part.   
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Thus we can see that both Archer and DeLanda are promoting the position that 
the way we live, however necessary and/or rationally conceived it may appear (at our 
scale), has a history and an irreducible element of contingency to it.  In other words, they 
want us to recognise that our ways of life and the histories that identify them are 
contingent and so the ways we live are, and remain, mutable.  My only concern with 
Archer is that she sometimes seems to lose sight of the importance of contingency and 
falls back into formulaic accounts of social process.  
In statements like the following: “as a human being sequentially becomes a self, 
then a primary agent and has the possibility of next developing into a corporate agent and 
finally into a personalised actor”120 we see the potentially problematic idea that the 
development of a self is a ‘sequence’, but given that developing to the next stage in the 
sequence in only ‘possible’, we also see another instance of the idea that human 
development can be arrested. This result is contrary to her deeper connection with the 
openness and creativity of neo-materialism, as indicated by the following quotation:  
... [human’s] can re-design the social array of roles, such that the positions available to them are 
ones in which they willingly invest themselves, and thus become the kinds of 'social selves' with 
whom they can voluntarily identify.121   
 
While this view of what a better world might be like does resonate with this 
thesis, this is not the only type of discussion she offers concerning bettering the world.  
One might choose just talking about emergence and its need for interacting variety, solely 
encouraging the fostering and maintenance of difference and its interaction, out of which 
new and better ways of life for more may emerge.  Archer, like older historical 
materialists, concentrates her politics on the ‘oppressed,’ their ‘situation,’ and the means 
                                                 
120 Archer, Being Human, 269 
121 Archer, Being Human, 269. 
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of mobilizing them.
122
  This is of course important but perhaps not the only route to 
change. 
Alternatively, we can show how what we, and the social entities that emerge from 
us, have been doing as social entities is inherently, at least initially (prior to development 
becoming arrested at some fixed point), self-transcending toward greater self-
identification—which is not to say that we should just leave it to happen on its own.  It is 
to say that anyone who can be, and is aware of this, is aware that to engage its project 
consciously is to animate betterment of and for oneself, and, of and for everyone, and 
everything else.   
The focus can be the encouragement of heterogeneity and interaction, arguing to 
maintain both for their own sake, as intrinsic values of human life, rather than for change 
out of pity for the down-trodden or rage about being down-trodden.  The point is 
encouraging positive change through positively constructing systematic alternatives.  The 
‘mobilised oppressed’ strategy has shown itself to be problematic, as has the mobilised 
vanguard of the oppressed.  And the pity from above strategy has shown itself to be of 
questionable affect as a motivator of social change among those with resources—many of 
whom are essentially good people who would rather not have their world ‘disrupted’, but 
would gladly welcome reasonable sustained change whose ends they understand and are 
able to experience as betterment for all, including, and importantly, for themselves.   
Marx described how some are oppressed and everyone is alienated (and so in 
some way oppressed).  We do not need to re-write that which has already been written. 
Instead, let us talk about ways to make life better for everyone.  Let’s talk about ways to 
                                                 
122 See for e.g. Archer, Being Human, 269-70. Where she writes of disrupting the structure. 
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do it that do not involve one faction disrupting, overcoming, assimilating, or eradicating 
another.  Let’s talk about what is and has been better about the ways we are and how to 
encourage it.  Let’s experiment and see how one might live.  I will now conclude the 
argument by unpacking this conception of an ethics of experimentation.       
The next chapter will look at Russon’s understanding of human socio-historical 
development and the role emergent goals play in it.  As we will see, for Russon, mutual 
equal recognition is an emergent goal of human history.  It provides the necessary social 
basis for the ethics of experiment I defend.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
88 
 
88 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
EMERGENCE, SELF-TRANSCENDENCE, LIFE 
 
 
Russon 
 
DeLanda’s general ontology, supplemented by Archer’s social categories, 
provides the ground from which Russon’s ethics of open possibility can grow.  His social 
world is one that is open to possibilities and experimentation, while still having a 
significant ethical dimension.  The previous three chapters laid out a case for the reality, 
in all realms, being a place of possibility and experimentation.  Assuming that reality is 
as this ontology says, the only ethical question that is adequate to that reality is how 
might one live?  Russon has an answer to this question that is not limiting, that is open to 
a creative, experimental response that reality as I interpret DeLanda’s ontology, makes 
possible. 
Below is Russon’s example of the emergence of the democratic political system 
in Ancient Greece, both from historical and literary analysis.  It is an example of 
Russon’s use of a conception of emergence and his notion that humans and social wholes 
are in an on-going process of development and self-transformation.    
Ancient Greece offers a helpful case study of the pattern of development of such family life. 
Athens, for example, was governed by a small number of long-established extended families each 
of which sought to win pre-eminence in power over the others. It was here that our modern sense 
of a specifically "political" life emerged, in the struggles by which Athens sought to establish a 
system of social organisation that denied to the family the right to identify itself as the primary 
social reality and to insist instead that the city—a social field built out of a variety of families— 
had to be recognised as worthy of the primary allegiance of all of its citizens, and that the city 
rather than the family would set the terms for legitimate and illegitimate action.123 
[There was a need] ... for something beyond the family and its vendetta-logic to govern 
human affairs, and the Oresteia ends with the emergence of a transfamilial council—the core of 
                                                 
123 Russon, Human Experience, 63. 
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the idea of a "state"—that recognises a larger sphere of social relations where family ties are not 
the ultimate ground for determining just action.124 
 
As we can see, Russon does not infer political structure form a pre-existing essence, but 
describes its historical emergence.   
The same attention to historical emergence applies to his understanding of what is 
most valuable in human life.  For Russon, “[h]uman fulfillment is accomplished in the 
establishing of a perspective governed by the norm of universality-as-sharedness.”125  But 
this is a “universality that has only an immanent meaning”126 and the sharedness is 
necessarily the interaction of difference, in that we are each an individual situated inter-
subjective body with its own singular set of familiarities.   
  The human as an embodied contact with a world beyond itself is always reaching 
beyond itself into the world, is always, in a sense, self-transcending.  “As bodies, we 
contact a world beyond ourselves, and, through our engagement with that world, we are 
drawn to develop beyond our original capacities.”127  “Experience, therefore, is not the 
construction of a representation that is somehow internal to an independent sphere called 
mind; experience is, rather, being outside myself in the world.”128  What we contact is 
what and a degree of how we experience.  The initial contact in this world and 
introduction to the rest of it, for Russon, is the family.   
                                                 
124 Russon, Human Experience, 64. 
125 John Russon, “On Human Identity: The Intersubjective Path from Body to Mind.” (Dialogue 
XLV, 2006, 307-314) 307.  Hereafter OHI. 
126 Russon, OHI, 314. 
127 Russon, OHI, 310. 
128 Russon, OHI, 308. 
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"The family" is the name for the enactment of this self-transformative process. A child is initiated 
into the reality of intersubjective experience— the "how" of others—through a history of 
particular dealings with particular others.129   
  
The family is a human being’s initial familiar others, it is part of what a human first 
contacts through its self-transcending process.  The family’s members are the initial 
example of who we are and what there is.  The family is that which initiates the human 
into the larger social world and so its own process of emergence, socialising humans, is 
also a self-transcendence.  Said differently, the process of the family, the interaction of its 
parts, while sustaining the family also pushes the parts that sustain it away (to different 
degrees and in different ways).   
Russon’s analysis of these dynamics admittedly focuses on a family structure that 
is arguably ‘western’.  But this is simply a case of looking at a specific population and 
describing the patterns that emerge without reference to a predetermined model or ideal 
end, bearing in mind that this structure like all is contingent at some scale. “If we are to 
be adequate empiricists, we must let our (rigorously enacted) observations specify the 
terms and parameters of our theories, rather than holding description answerable to 
theory.”130 DeLanda follows the same path, as evidenced by him only looking at concrete 
(real) things and processes as the source of understanding. 
 Granting the contingency of the family, at the scale and space-time of humans as 
long as we have known ourselves, Russon’s conception of the family as initially most 
familiar others, remains consistent across populations of animal based social entities.  
From that initial self-transcendence toward a family, virtually infinite paths might be 
taken, but the process can be and is arrested differently and for different durations for 
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different people.  However, this self-transcendence could be maintained indefinitely.  We 
could consciously move toward a reality of maximising this capacity for the most people.  
I contend that the ontology and the epistemology indicated by this thesis are compatible 
with a move to this reality. 
 
 
DeLanda+Russon  
 
 
Where a reified ideal telos can arrest our development in various ways to varying 
degrees because of the irreconcilability of the ideal/real dichotomy, an emergent telos 
emerges from the real and propels us to develop the real.
 131
  Russon’s mutual equal 
recognition (universality-as-sharedness) is submitted as the emergent telos that can 
animate sustained human development of the real in novel and experimental ways.   
DeLanda’s reality is one of creation animated by difference, of fluidity, where I 
argue, humans need not have their development arrested by ideals imposed as necessary.  
Having our development arrested, for Russon, places us in ‘neurotic postures’, or a state 
of self-contradiction.  Russon:   
In studying this stance of our intersubjective contacting that is so familiar to us—the stance of the 
"ego"—we will again be discerning the dynamic, self-transcending character of a stance that 
typically takes itself to be static and settled. We will see how disparity between what it is and what 
it takes itself to be is the source of significant problems in human life. In studying this posture we 
will see why human life characteristically faces problems in its development—specifically, we 
will understand how the development of our subject-object contact becomes a neurotic posture.132 
                                                 
131 Recall that the virtual, actual and intensive are all the real.  So, these genuine teloi can and do 
emerge from the immanent (virtual) patterns represented in phase space and simulations, they need not only 
emerge from the actual. 
132 John Russon, Human Experience: Philosophy, Neurosis, and the Elements of Everyday Life 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2003), 72. Hereafter Human Experience. 
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Essentially, if we take ourselves and others to be self-transcending rather than 
static (separate/totalised/essential) we will be less neurotic.  Russon’s critique of how we 
think with reference to this, the prejudice of presence (which includes in here/out there, 
mind/body, subject/object dichotomies or dualisms), resonates with the critique of the 
dogmatic image of thought.
 133
  Holding on to these prejudices and dichotomies, among 
other things, supports operating on one’s surroundings (including body) in a way that 
does not recognise that this operating not only can but does affect oneself and others in 
some way at some scale.  Russon, speaking of the image of thought in question, with 
reference to the human self, the body, the world, and how we think about it: 
According to this narrative, the self (as we saw in our study of the prejudices of presence in 
chapter 1) is a discrete individual, separate from a world of things and other individuals upon 
which one passes judgment, and separate from one’s own embodiment, which is treated as a tool 
or a vehicle that one "has" or "uses."134   
 
The world is static, I am separate from that world out there, my body is part of that 
separate out there, both are mine to do what with I will.  People who follow this narrative 
often devalue the out there and deal with it inadequately.  The ‘other’ (including our 
body) is something to operate on or pass judgment upon, rather than learn from, 
experiment with, and teach.  Out there is taken to be something that we are in a sense 
entitled to but not responsible for or to.  Or in other neurotic (arrested) cases it is taken 
something to be feared or as something devoid of meaning and possibility.  
Contra this problematic understanding of human existence and identity, we can 
“...come to understand existence as simply the dynamic of embodiment within which the 
two poles of self and other come to be defined, and out of which the substance of their 
                                                 
133 See the first section of Human Experience called ‘Challenging Traditional Prejudices’. 
134 Russon, Human Experience, 83. 
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development into complex self-identities grows.”135 It is a process of interacting 
differences that self-identity (like all) emerges from. 
What brings these ‘poles’ together into interaction, what capacity is immanent to 
our initial condition, such that when actualised it opens a possibility space for the 
emergence of an experimental self-identity?  I argue that it is our capacity for self-
transcendence within a society of mutually recognising selves that enables this creation.  
Linking a general ontology of creative complexity to the social allows the above to be 
more clearly understood, which allows it to be seen as the material foundation for an 
ethics that supports open experimentation as human flourishing.   Insofar as human 
beings reach beyond themselves, there is interaction and so development.  Human self-
transcendence is unique to humans, but it emerges from the developmental processes of 
nature whereby non-living material elements ‘transcended’ themselves through the 
emergent properties of life to which their interaction gave rise.  What is unique to human 
self-transcendence is that we can think about ever new and experimental ways to 
transcend what we do.  A sunflower self-transcends to do what it does, but it cannot 
transcend what it does and still be a sunflower.  Beyond some basic doings like 
socialising, eating, drinking, sheltering, and sleeping to adequate degrees (which can all 
be done in highly variable ways), as well dying, there is nothing necessary that humans 
do to be humans.
136
  We can live differently, a sunflower cannot.  Sunflowers, like all 
                                                 
135 Russon, Human Experience, 26.  
136 Though even these currently ‘necessary’ basic doings (including death) might be transcended 
eventually—as the transhumanists would have it.  
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life-forms, can evolve, but human beings can consciously do so in directions that they 
themselves invent.     
 
Human Experience/Emergence  
 
Russon, like DeLanda, dissolves the ideal/real dichotomy, uses a bottom-up 
approach and his philosophy resonates with the sciences of dynamics and complexity.
137
  
For both, reality, like music, must also be experienced in its movement, not just frozen 
and atomised.  The following, in broad strokes, traces Russon’s approach and correlates it 
with DeLanda’s.   
Russon begins his approach to human experience ‘in its movement’ with (1) the 
form of human experience, which consists in (1.a) interpretation or the effort to organise 
and integrate all of the dimensions of our experience into a coherent whole, (1.b) 
embodiment or the point where each of us is something specific (our individual mode of 
contact, how we are open to and how we open to others and the rest of reality), and (1.c) 
memory or the present explication of the significance implicit in the identities of objects 
with which we are engaged, where how we engage relates to our past commitments.  
Someone’s location in space-time emerges from their projects, which emerge from their 
past as remembered and interpreted, and from what s/he is committed to.  In the terms of 
this thesis, Russon’s ‘forms’ of human experience are the parameters (degrees of 
freedom) of the space of human possibilities that he has selected as important.   
                                                 
137 As I argue, but see also: David Morris, “The Open Figure of Experience and Mind,” Dialogue 
XLV (2006): 315-326. 
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The next phase is (2) the substance or stuff of human experience which consists 
of (2.a) familiar others and (2.b) unfamiliar others (things we are and are not habituated 
to) and (2.c) neurosis or holding contradictory beliefs that place us into neurotic 
situations where our habits impede rather than enable.
 138
  For instance the situation that 
emerges from believing in a democratic emancipatory project while postulating a static 
(ideal) reality.  This phase can be correlated with the intensive.  
I thinking about the intensive as related to the social we can think of neurotic 
postures mentioned in the previous section.  They are literally, though not only, physical 
postures we contort our bodies into, as well as involuntary and awkward behaviours, 
including ways of walking, talking, and eating.  Insofar as these are related to our beliefs 
(expectations founded on memory) and how we make contact with reality, which is 
related to how we interpret reality, neurotic postures are also more than merely our 
physical postures.  For Russon, the very notion of normalcy is the prevalent neurotic 
posture among members of ‘western’ social wholes.  However, it is important to note that 
neuroses/habits acquired from contacting what and those that surround us, are initially 
and for the most part how we are in the world.  For DeLanda too, “[t]he main 
territorialising process providing the assemblage [human identity] with a stable identity is 
habitual repetition.”139 These processes of habituation (learning) have intensive 
characteristics, given that they are interactions with difference (the unfamiliar) 
proceeding toward familiarity.  Like convection trying to move temperature differences 
                                                 
138 The term phase has been maintained because it lacks hierarchical connotation while it captures 
that there is a development in passing from one phase to another.  Phase transitions can go in any direction. 
139 DeLanda, New Philosophy of Society, 50. 
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toward equilibrium.  However like convection in the mantel or the atmosphere where 
equilibrium is never reached because the difference is maintained by the core and the sun 
respectively, humans are constantly bombarded with unfamiliarities and so the process of 
learning (habituation) never needs to end.  The familiar-unfamiliar gradient will never be 
equalised, though it can be engaged more or less consciously and its process can be more 
or less arrested. 
Russon’s final phase (scale, strata) of complexity (order and novelty) in Human 
Experience is (3) the process of experience or how one lives life, as immanent to and 
emergent from its form and substance.  For Russon, this process is not inhibitively 
neurotic when it consists of learning qua therapy qua philosophy, that is, when it consists 
of “bringing the multiple significance that is our experience into a situation of 
coherence.”140  The successively more complex modes of experience we move through 
each emerge from complex interactions within, between, and across the previous ones.  
There is multi-scaled feedback and emergence.   
 At each phase Russon shows how the next more complex way of contacting 
reality (being open to and experiencing reality) emerges from the previous, adding 
another layer which then interacts with the previous layers.  For instance, “The family is 
thus both an autonomous form of inter-subjective experience and also an agent for 
initiating the family members into the larger form of social experience.”141 The family is 
emergent and not a closed totality; it is an assemblage that to varying degrees enables its 
parts to enter other assemblages.  When we are habituated to the complexities of being 
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part of an assemblage (for instance a family) we can maintain that assemblage without 
being limited to it, that is, we can enter into other more complex assemblages without 
dissolving the prior one (though we might).   
Russon conceptualises the process of habituation as how we develop into more 
complex worlds.  How, for instance, once we are habituated to driving a vehicle we are 
then open to the world made possible by having the vehicle as a mode of making contact 
with the world.  Initially our attention is held by acquiring the habit.  Another example is 
how with each reading of a text more and different things can be understood. Another 
example would be how with each editing of an essay familiarity with the essay allows 
one to address things that would not have been caught previously.  There is also how the 
individual edits from one time through potentially catalyse other changes the next.  Once 
we are habituated or familiar we can add a new layer, our identity is changed. 
Personal identity … may be deterritorialised not only by loss of stability but also by augmentation 
of capacities [by self-transcending] … When a young child learns to swim or to ride a bicycle, for 
example, a new world suddenly opens up for experience, filled with new impressions and ideas 
[with unfamiliar to become familiar, opening other new unfamiliarities...].142  
 
To articulate the development toward complexity through habituation another 
way, we could say that initially we find our significance only in our needs.  Consider a 
new born.  They are only an interpretation of their immediate contact with reality, with 
their whole self they reach out for what they need to be content and comfortable, they are 
nothing but what they need/want and having those needs satisfied.  From the perspective 
of our initial awareness of embodiment ‘I’ am all that matters, but through contact with 
(openness to, self-transcendence toward, response-ability to) demands that ‘I’ do not 
control, ‘I’ realise that ‘I’ am merely something that matters.  And as ‘I’ become familiar 
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(habituated) with this, ‘I’ am opened by and to these others.  As we become familiar with 
the complexities of our family we become open to those of larger social populations and 
so on.  
For Russon, “the development of human self-identity ... is the form of the inherent 
goal of the human project of mutual, equal recognition”.143  In other words, the 
development of a coherent and healthy human self-identity is the realisation of the project 
of mutual equal recognition.  This telos, taken up as a goal or not, shows itself to be 
immanent to the process of human development qua human development and not given 
from the outside, as an eternal idea towards which human history develops.  As Russon 
argues, 
Our very nature is this propulsion towards being a person, equal to others as a representative of 
what it is to be human. This means a political ideal of universal equality is immanent to our 
nature; it equally means that an ideal of objectivity—knowing according to the perspective anyone 
would adopt—is immanent to our nature. What we see in our analysis of ourselves as bodies, 
however, is that this universality can never be an escape from specificity or from the perspectival 
character of our identity, for this specificity is the sole context within which the ideal of 
universality is meaningful. Universality in human life, then, whether in politics or in knowledge, is 
not a pregiven perspective that we can adopt by leaving our perspectival roots. It is rather the ever-
present norm, immanent to all our dealings, which precisely takes the form of a demand to 
reconcile: political universality is realised as disparate cultures accomplishing a sharedness of 
perspective; epistemological universality is realised jointly in the identification with that which we 
seek to know (we saw this in habit, above) in a context of a social accomplishment of sharedness 
of perspective.144 
 
While it might sound as if Russon’s language presupposes something like 
‘substance ontology,’ I argue he is not a proponent of such a position.  The first move in 
justifying my interpretation is to define the conception of ‘immanent’.  ‘Immanent’, in 
DeLanda’s sense, essentially means emergent from, or, could not be without that to 
which it is inherent, but is not reducible to it.  When something is immanent to 
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something, a population, it emerges from the population simply because of what that 
population is (its properties, capacities to-to be, and tendencies).  Recall also that all 
emergence involves the interaction of different things.  It is not that universal equality 
and objectivity ‘emanate’ from humans, it not that they are ‘the essence of the human 
project’.  Given humans as they are and the parts that compose them, from the interaction 
involved in humans being humans, universal equal recognition emerges as the outcome 
of their interactions and conflicts.  Contrary to substance ontology, these emergent goals 
or teloi do not entail a homogenisation, but openness to experiment and experiments.  If 
this driving goal were a simple one toward everyone being the same, we would be, for 
instance, if this were the case the oppressed would not revolt.  The goals of universality-
as-sharedness are pursued through learning, not through narrowing by conforming to an 
abstract ideal imposed from without.  It is not about all of us being and knowing the 
same, it is about us recognising difference, having it interact, and learning from it.  
Wars can be seen as an example of recognition as it manifests under the ideal/real 
dichotomy, while they are also exemplary of development fuelled by feedback, and self-
transcendence.  Given that, as Russon and other theorists of recognition have argued, an 
important human drive is needing and wanting to be recognised by others as one 
recognises oneself, or, “having our own measuring of significance measure up to the 
standards of others.”145  In war, or in situations that spawn violence, there is a lack of 
mutuality in the recognition of one group for another, if not each for the other.  For 
instance they might recognise each other equally as enemy but not mutually insofar as 
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they do not recognise each other as they each recognise themselves and demand to be 
recognised.  Further, perhaps one or both cannot be mutually recognised because the way 
they recognise themselves and want to be recognised inherently does not adequately 
recognise others.  Conflict can be seen to emerge from deficiencies of mutuality and 
equality which are products of the self-contradiction (internal conflict) that arises from 
not being recognised by others in the way one recognises one’s self or vice versa.  Instead 
we can try to recognise others as they recognise themselves and try to be in a way that 
others can recognise, which is inherently a way that recognises others (where others is 
not only humans but everything).  In other words, we can maximise our capacity to 
recognise and be recognised, and they are facets of the same thing, to genuinely do one is 
always to do both.  
DeLanda points out that conflict, as a form of feedback, and an intense one at that, 
has driven much development by forming auto-catalytic loops e.g. like those formed by 
arms races between predator and prey in biological evolution, or those between warring 
European nations throughout much of the last millennium.
 146
  It is the difference between 
the interacting components that leads to novel combinations and novel emergences.  But, 
for humans, this difference can be mutually and equally recognised and so does not have 
to manifest as violence.  We can have interaction of difference and development that is 
just as (probably more) intense than it is with violent conflict if we consciously and 
openly engage difference, interaction, and development.   
For both thinkers, development entails interaction and interaction entails 
difference.  The self transcends itself in order to be itself, which entails interacting with 
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others (difference) and from this the social entity ‘family’ emerges.  The family too, as 
part of sustaining itself as what it is, transcends itself by initiating the members whose 
development it harbours into larger social scales, who then transcend themselves, 
catalyzing the emergence and maintenance of other things at other scales. 
Russon’s bottom-up approach to who we are, and DeLanda’s bottom-up approach 
to what there is, both dissolve dichotomies and explain things through processes of 
emergence.
 
 DeLanda’s bottom-up approach has provided an ontological basis from 
which to understand Russon’s bottom-up approach.   
This section will end by broadly correlating 1000yrs and Human Experience.  In 
1000yrs DeLanda begins with what he calls (1) geological history, which deals with the 
“dynamical elements (energy flow, nonlinear causality) that we have [without metaphor] 
in common with rocks and mountains and other nonliving historical structures.”147  That 
is, how all things, in the same way as rocks are “nothing but accumulations of materials 
shaped and hardened by history”148—the form or parameters of reality.  In Russon’s case 
he is not talking about all of reality but only human reality.  Nonetheless he begins his 
journey up with the ‘form’ or parameters.  Next is (2) biological history, that is, how 
things interact and lead to the emergence of entities like species, food chains, families, 
interpersonal networks, and groups.  For Russon, the substance or stuff of our reality, that 
is the intensive.  Through discussing the evolution of species and the dynamics genes 
DeLanda shows that while there are patterns shared between the physical and the 
biological, there those that are unique to the biological.  Last is (3) linguistic history, that 
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is, how relatively simple social entities interact and other more complex social entities 
like organisations, governments, anti-markets and nation-states emerge from the feedback 
facilitated by language—For Russon the process of our reality is at its most complex at 
the scale of responsible human agency as a property and power of human linguistic 
society.  More generally the process of reality refers to how novelty and organisation 
emerge from interacting populations.  But also DeLanda’s linguistic history is the history 
of language as viewed through intensive, population, and topological thinking.  And is an 
example of a realm where many of the patterns from the physical and biological can be 
found to exist along with patterns unique to the material that is human languages. 
 We now turn to a more detailed discussion of the telos submitted by this thesis. 
 
Mutual Equal Recognition 
 
Talk of an emergent telos is not talk about secret forces or positive thinking as a 
causal force in some mystical sense.  Nothing happens because of a force, a god, or 
‘positive thinking’.  The argument concerns the real creative potential of material 
assemblages as a result of their own real natures.  That is not to say that these creative 
potentials are as fantastic as those we can imagine, it is to say that they are more 
incredible, inspiring and unimaginable, because they are real.
149
  In a real way, if you can 
‘think positive’ and ‘feel better’ and so engage the world in a more active, adaptive and 
resilient way, barring anomalies like biohazards or getting hit by a bus, your life will go 
                                                 
149 “…we saw only reality all around us, taking the imaginary and the symbolic to be illusory 
categories.”  (Deleuze, Negotiations, 144). 
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better.  Put differently, if you are out there trying when opportunities emerge you are able 
to engage them.  If you recognise in a more mutual and equal way, on the whole, more 
will probably come back to you.  It is about creating a pattern not necessarily getting the 
better of each individual interaction. 
This pattern of recognition could be described as forming an autocatalytic loop, a 
self-sustaining gradient (recognitionlack of recognitionrecognition, or, 
familiarunfamiliarfamiliar; the more that is recognised the more there is to 
recognise; the more you know, the more there is to know), that animates the genuine 
development of individual humans, social wholes and their sustaining substrata.   
Insofar as we emerge from the interaction of wholes that precede us and given 
that we exist alongside some of these others, the self-sustaining gradient of recognition 
can be seen to animate human development.  Ontogeny recapitulating phylogeny 
recapitulating cosmogony, where what is shared is the self-sustaining universal 
singularity of recognition (interaction of difference).  Generalising and skipping many 
phases: Oxygen and hydrogen ‘recognise’ each otheramino acids and proteins 
‘recognise’ each otherbuilding humans that can really, self-consciously recognise each 
otherand then collectively recognise the Universe as their ultimate origin—all is the 
Universe recognising itself, the form of recognition always developing.   
At human social scales, the levelling of classes, and the constitutional 
establishment of ‘rights’ are examples of development animated by recognition, but 
neither is an end in itself, nor will there ever be an end; there will always be more to be 
mutually equally recognisant of and more ways to be so. 
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A further example of development animated by mutual equal recognition is the 
development of what could be called our environmental consciousness.  Historically, 
humans have been (and are) largely unaware or ignorant of their effect on the planet.  
This is the case even if they have relatively low impact on their surrounding environment, 
which tends to be due to low population and low intensity ways of living, or even if they 
have some mystical and/or ritualised sense of interconnectedness with and so some kind 
of respect for ‘the environment’.  The ignorance amounts to humans not seeing things at 
enough spatio-temporal scales.  Generally, humans did (and still do) not recognise their 
environments and Earth as equally evolving entities we are a part of, and if they did it 
was not to a degree adequate to actually understanding the mechanisms connection and 
affect beyond its mere fact.  Humans did (many still do) not recognise their surrounding 
environs and Earth as that which recognises them by composing their reality as the sole 
sustaining substrata (so far, and for a long while yet) of our existence—again this need 
not only be recognised mystically and artistically, it also needs to be recognised 
scientifically, empirically and philosophically.  Our consciousness-awareness-
intentionality-recognisance is developing and we are becoming more aware of our effect 
on the planet (we can think bigger; take more into account). We can look at things in 
terms of larger more detailed historical accounts, we can think in terms of different 
entities, we can think in terms of things at different spatial scales (like atoms, us, 
communities, nation-states, planets, and beyond) and we can think in terms of the 
different life spans and rates of development (temporal scales) that these entities have and 
exist at (like geological time, human time, evolutionary time and cosmic time).   
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Along with the development of this consciousness there has been correlative 
physical, technological and cultural development, for example, blue box trucks and 
recycling infrastructure, consumer LED light products, solar panels, wind turbines, 
documentary film, live oration, and TV commercials about environmental issues and 
awareness.  None of these are final solutions, they are attempts or experiments, they are 
solutions to a well-posed problem.  But we might wonder, along with Protevi, 
Has global warming pushed us already into a crisis, modelled by a zone of sensitivity in which a 
minor fluctuation that otherwise would not have budged us off our attractor, but merely moved us 
to another point on that attractor, will now push us into another attractor, the ice age attractor, that 
is, into a new climate pattern? Or will the global system create a new pattern, neither temperate 
nor ice age, but something different? The global climate system might be creative and resilient, 
but there's no guarantee the new pattern will provide a viable environment for human beings!150 
 
And as a result, reassess the methods and intensity with which we are engaging how we 
might live in interaction with the environment. 
To recapitulate the key points:  the ways we have lived have been experiments, 
they have been developments driven by our drive for mutual equal recognition.  
However, for the dogmatic image of thought, the successive life styles that have emerged 
were each in their turn seen to be part of a necessary progression toward an ideal 
homogenous and universal life style.  Effectively, our development is arrested to varying 
degrees for durations of time, until the next inevitable bifurcation, which changes us, but 
is then taken and made to be a necessary step in a necessary progression.   
To assume that we can figure out a final answer to how we should live is to 
assume we know what the future holds i.e. that the world is static, or at least wholly 
linear and so technically perfectly predictable.  If we make conscious that nothing is 
static, that the subject and the object are not dichotomously divided (not oppositionally 
hierarchised) but part of dynamic tensions or gradients.  If we consciously engage 
                                                 
150 Protevi, DGE, 26 
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development within fluid reality driven by mutual equal recognition, who knows how one 
might live?  What we can know is that there will be as many experiments (answers), as 
there are lives, if society permits this sort of creativity. As Russon argues,   
…the society that is universally open to the human condition must be one that accepts this 
necessity of social diversity as its premise.  The “universal” society, then, is one that 
acknowledges the experiential primacy of cultural pluralism—of narrative pluralism—and sees the 
universality of a shared human environment as something to be achieved through learning to make 
such narratives communicate rather than as a given, already existent situation of human 
equality.151  
 
As we are, humans navigate by becoming familiar with their surroundings (all 
biological life does this in a certain sense).  This being the case, each human is a singular 
assemblage of familiarities; we are each individuated singularities with our own 
memories, habits, and narratives.  And so, our condition is immanent pluralism, even if 
only because we each view the world from different eyes.  Moreover, “our very 
familiarity with the human world propels us into relations with strangers,”152 recall how 
becoming familiar with riding a bike opens us to (propels us into) a world of new 
(strange) experiences, or how the family propels us into other social wholes.   
I am as strange to you as you are to me, and we are to they, and they are to we, 
since we each have our own familiar sphere.  There can be as much or as little difference 
between two bankers as there is between one of those bankers and an escort.  If 
difference is mutually equally recognised who knows what novel ways of living might 
emerge from the virtually infinite novel combinations of different components; who 
knows what capacities might be actualised?  Not that there are not better and worse ways 
of living.  If your way encourages the maximising of the capacities of others your 
                                                 
151 Russon, Human Experience, 72. 
152 Russon, Human Experience, 73. 
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capacities will be maximised.  The only prescription is allowing the capacities of others 
to be maximised and trying to maximise one’s own which is trying to maximise 
everybody’s.    
When we are not and, more importantly, do not recognise each other, our 
development is arrested; when we do not recognise ourselves as we are, obscuring what 
we might be, because of imposed ideals our capacity to and our capacity to be recognised 
is diminished. “We are our possibilities for interactions with things, and things are their 
possibilities for our interaction.”153  Limiting our interaction limits our development and 
thus also the possibilities for our capacities to be actualised. 
 The emergent goal (property, capacity, and tendency) of mutual equal 
recognition includes seeking to recognise yourself as you really, rather than ideally, are.  
This does not refer to finding an eternal essential self, or perpetuating the ways you have 
been and are.  To try to see one’s self in its reality is part of the continual process of 
transcending that self.  To be familiar with how one actually lives is to be opened to what 
is beyond that way of living.  All this serves to support open experiments in how one 
might live.   
 If people were mutually equally recognised, not merely ignorantly tolerated with 
reference to their degree of deviation from an ideal, they may not feel the need/desire to 
engage in, for instance, abusive behaviour.  Similarly, someone (who has the choice) 
might not feel the need to individuate themselves by choosing to dress inadequately for 
their climate (even when they have the option); they would dress adequately and reap the 
benefits.  In all situations there are types of clothing and ways of wearing clothing that 
                                                 
153 Russon, Human Experience, 31. 
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facilitate and encourage connection and interaction with the environment and so further 
develops recognition of the environment and the other humans that are part of it.  If you 
are comfortable you are more open to recognising and being recognised by what 
surrounds you.  This protection of our flesh is actually a maximisation of our flesh, it 
increases the things that can be contacted and the ways things can be contacted.  Also, it 
leaves our flesh supple and sensitive and so more open to experience, experimentation 
and observation in situations where protection is not needed.  The more supple our senses 
the more we can recognise, the more intimate our contact with what surrounds us, the 
more solutions to how one might live we can create, the less our development is arrested. 
The project of mutual equal recognition, for Russon, describes and explains how 
and why humans move through increasingly complex modes of making contact with 
reality.  Human beings move themselves from crawling, to walking, to running, from 
babbling, to talking, to formulating arguments, spoken and then through other mediums.  
Mutual equal recognition can explain and describe how and why we develop.  Given the 
continuum of matter-energy-information-thought that we are part of, as mentioned, I 
argue that mutual equal recognition is an emergent telos of the known universe of matter-
energy-information-thought: We are part of the open assemblage of n assemblages 
developing its recognition of itself.   
As much as human behaviour in a given situation is an expression of our 
interpretation of the demands the situation makes on us as significant, so is the behaviour 
of an other an expression of their interpretation of the demands a situation makes on them 
as significant.  This is what needs to be mutually equally recognised for us to freely and 
openly engage asking the question of how one might live.  Insofar as we are each other’s 
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examples and confirmation we have a responsibility to each other; we are response-able.  
The degree to which this response-ability is engaged correlates with the degree to which 
development is arrested for and by one. 
…in the case of the larger society, just as in the case of the family and the case of the body, we can 
see that the determinate form that one’s given situation takes will set the limits to the resources 
that the situation offers for inhibiting or enabling one’s development, one’s self-transcending 
activity of contact.154 
 
Mutual equal recognition as an explicit goal, that is, fully actualising our immanent 
response-ability as a goal, opens us to confident experimentation; it drives us to ask how 
one might live with mutual equal recognition as an explicit goal. 
To be a body, a subject-object, is to be a being of possibility, a being open to the emergence of 
determinateness from a horizon of indeterminacy.  The hand is a determinacy ... [that makes] 
grasping possible—it is that by which I can grasp—and as such it is a route that opens us to a 
multitude of as yet unimagined experience.155 
 
Given this determinate openness, the multitude of possible experiences, and the relational 
character of capacities to affect and be affected i.e. reality as it is and our self-
transcending character, we can only ask how might one live? 
I contend that all philosophy, religion, science, and art, further, that everything 
humans do, to varying degrees manifests and expresses (1) what there is, (2) how it came 
be, (3) why it is the way it is, and (4) prescribes a way of living.  In most of his work, 
DeLanda tries not to explicitly address (4), doing his Deleuzean best to merely pose the 
problem well.  I guess through it all we remain a degree Marxian, holding to the eleventh 
thesis on Feuerbach: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world ...; the point is, to 
change, it.”156  So, we have made some prescriptions, but really they amount to 
                                                 
154 Russon, Human Experience, 69.   
155 Russon, Human Experience, 31. 
156 Karl Marx, Selected Writings, ed. L. H. Simon (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), 176. 
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prescribing that the individual choose to take on the project of prescribing (designing) 
their own life, given the virtual parameters of reality and the actual parameters (material 
conditions) individual to them.  As just indicated, a goal of this project, then, is also 
minimising the human created actual parameters that limit capacities to actively engage 
in critical self-transformation.  Let’s not limit each other, let try to limit the limitations on 
each other.  Let the virtual pose the problems, free the actual, which frees the virtual, 
which frees the actual, which frees... 
  
How Might One Live? 
 
As I have argued, seeing the world as static and determined from without by an 
ideal telos has led us to ask how we should live and moreover to impose answers to his 
question as necessary.  In contrast, genuinely engaging fluid reality projecting toward 
mutual equal recognition opens us to asking “how might one live?” and its virtually 
infinite imaginable and unimaginable possibilities.  According to May “how might one 
live?” is the question central to Deleuze’s philosophy. 
It’s an odd question, in some sense; a question we don’t ask ourselves very often.  We get up in 
the morning, we brush our teeth, we crawl into our clothing, and we burn our days as though it 
were impossible to live any other way, as though this particular life were the only one to be lived.  
As though the universe were so constructed that it required our lives to unfold in this way and in 
no other.157… It is a difficult question, a frightening one.  There is much in us that rebels against 
confronting it, taking it into our lives and creating ourselves in light of the freedom it offers.  It is 
simpler just to brush our teeth, crawl into our clothing, and burn our days than to ask what we 
might become.158 
 
                                                 
157 May, Gilles Deleuze, 1. 
158 May, Gilles Deleuze, 8.  
111 
 
111 
 
  The Star Trek
159
 franchise can be seen as an engagement with thought 
experiments in how one might live.  Each species encountered, each new technological or 
sociological development that emerges leads the characters to explicitly explore how they 
might live considering what has been encountered and what is emerging from the 
interaction.  Each encounter is taken by the lead characters as an opportunity (if possible) 
to develop a genuine relation of learning, helping, and teaching.  
I reference Star Trek because I know it better than I know Shakespeare or some 
other respected/time tested reference.  And because I have learned a lot from it, and 
believe others might too.  There are things to be gained, as there are from any and all 
interactions.  Not that some things do not take too much in giving what they give.  Some 
things currently end apparent human life.  Besides those that kill you, there is something 
to be gained from any situation, even if the situation is an overall loss.  Not to make light 
in any way or to imply that he would not trade what he got for never having had the 
experience, but Primo Levi gained insights into humanity, himself, war, life and death, 
through his time in Auschwitz, and he wrote a book about it.
160
   You can scan the scales 
of your experience and find the remarkable, interesting, and important.  You can by some 
measure try to improve your toilet cleaning method each time.  Life can be lived by 
developing the habit to improve and learn from any and every situation.  The point is not 
to hierarchise, but to grow, develop, try new things, and expand your self and its 
capacities. 
                                                 
159 Created by Gene Rodenberry.   
160 See Primo Levi, S. J. Woolf, and Philip Roth. Survival in Auschwitz: the Nazi assault on 
humanity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).  
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Humans are determined to be self-determined; material reality has determined us 
to be able to creatively change material reality.  Through learning 
(experimenting/exploring) we become more self-determined within the effectively 
infinite range of what might be done given reality.  Though determined we are free 
insofar as the layers of determination are infinite and so also our journey of learning.  But 
this is not just a simple journey of discovering what is always already there.  What we 
think of as always already there has not always already been there, at a large enough 
scale everything flows.  All life-styles, in the broadest and most detailed sense, are 
contingent actualisations of human capacities given particular contingent conditions.  We 
cannot perfectly predict/control life-styles by controlling conditions but we can to the 
degrees we can alter ourselves and our conditions and experiment with how one might 
live.  This can be done in an ethically responsible way with reference to the real material 
(physical and social) life-requirements of human beings.  
With each passing moment we are in a novel reality. Although we are often 
unaware of this, we can get into the habit of making ourselves aware of it by learning to 
think at other scales.  Everything is a spatio-temporal historical development and we can 
affect these developments in varying ways and to vary degrees correlative to our degree 
of understanding.  Regarding understanding, if reality is nonlinear and ontologically flat, 
if there is feedback within and across scales, if difference is the animator, and if 
replication is variable, there can be no permanent prescription for how we or anything 
should live.  The only questions are how have things been?  And how might they be?   
Genuine development embraces the unending nature of development and the 
difference that animates it.  Genuine development encourages adaptability and resilience, 
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and the emergence of the most (quality and quantity) for the longest (quality and 
quantity).  Genuine development thrives on heterogeneity.  If we flee from a life of 
genuine development, we are sentenced to self-contradiction and arrested development in 
the name of homogeneity (equilibrium
161
).  This sentence would remain a problem even 
if that homogeneity is marketed as ‘diversity’, ‘equality’, ‘multi-culturalism’, 
‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
161 “Nonequilibrium brings order out of chaos” (Prigogine & Stengers, Order out of Chaos, 286).  
Without difference there is homogeneous randomness.  A contained body of water that is turbulent due to 
temperature differences has order, a contained body of water with no differences and no motion being 
produced by the influence of an outside source of energy, has no order, it is random, its molecules move 
this way and that without rhyme or reason; there is no difference, nothing changes.     
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